At first glance, the overall vote for the left slightly exceeded the combined vote for the right. In fact, the left reached an agreement to vote against the oligarchic candidate, who during his year in office had pushed through neoliberal reforms and militarised the country, leading to serious human rights violations —including the extrajudicial killing of four Afro-Ecuadorian children detained by the army. This technical tie shifted in the weeks leading up to the runoff due to cash handouts and gifts, and with a National Electoral Council that allowed the incumbent president and candidate, Noboa, to campaign using public funds. Amid allegations of fraud on election day itself, Noboa won by ten points and was declared president.

However, after the election, the Constitutional Court — which had endorsed the irregular presidential campaign — ruled against the government on several of its militarisation decrees, triggering a major institutional crisis. As a form of pressure, Noboa proposed a constitutional reform without the endorsement of the Constitutional Court and called for marches around its headquarters, directly targeting the magistrates. At one point, an attempt was even made to evacuate the Court building over an alleged bomb threat.

A War Against the Popular Sectors

Amid this institutional crisis, on 12 September the government issued Decree 126, which eliminated the diesel subsidy. This measure had been a decisive factor behind the popular and Indigenous uprisings of October 2019 and June 2022, which paralysed the country for eight and eighteen days respectively. Both uprisings ended after negotiations between the Indigenous movement and the government in power, which ultimately withdrew the measure. The popular mobilisation over fuel subsidies rests on two premises: on the one hand, the rising cost of the basic food basket; on the other, the measure removes the only mechanism that mitigates the enrichment of economic groups that have benefited from oil extraction.

In response, the leadership of the Indigenous movement, trade union centres and left-wing organisations called for mobilisation against Decree 126. A few days later, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) announced a national strike to begin on 22 September. As a show of force, the Ecuadorian government temporarily moved the presidency to Latacunga, a city south of Quito, and the vice-presidency to Otavalo, in the north. Both cities are home to two of the country’s most influential Indigenous organisations — those of Cotopaxi and Imbabura provinces — the very centres of the 2019 and 2022 uprisings.

During the first days of the strike, the Constitutional Court finally granted the government authorisation for the popular consultation, after it had applied through the ordinary route. Four questions were approved: two populist ones, regarding the reduction of assembly members in the legislature and the elimination of public funding for political parties; and two of greater significance — allowing United States military bases on Ecuadorian soil (in line with Donald Trump’s military agenda) and the key question: convening a new constituent process. In this way, the oligarchic government was effectively declaring war on the popular sectors and setting the stage for the dismantling of one of the most advanced constitutions in terms of rights.

An Unprecedented Repression

The strike began with major roadblocks in the northern highlands, especially in Imbabura, accompanied by additional blockades in the central highlands and in Quito. There were also demonstrations in other parts of Ecuador, including in Cuenca, the country’s third-largest city, which in the weeks prior to Decree 126 had seen a historic march against large transnational metal mining companies, following three popular referendums that had rejected mining activities. Acts of support were also recorded in 16 of the country’s 24 provinces during the first three days of the national strike.

The military deployment multiplied the Ecuadorian State’s capacity for warfare against the strike: assault rifles, military tanks, and the widespread use of helicopters and drones. At the same time, in the first days of the strike, the government carried out administrative repression by freezing 70 bank accounts belonging to individuals and institutions of social organisations and allied collectives, under the false pretext of pursuing terrorism and drug trafficking. This confirmed the warnings issued months earlier by human rights organisations regarding the Social Transparency Law, which restricts the right to association in the country.

The presence of the Vice-Presidency in Otavalo prompted a major military deployment in the demographic and symbolic capital of the Kichwa people which, from the outset, repressed the mobilisations.

The use of high-calibre bullets aimed at the bodies of demonstrators meant that, in the early days, numerous people were admitted to hospitals with gunshot wounds and extremely serious medical diagnoses.

In the face of this dictatorial deployment against the popular and Indigenous strike, human rights organisations began documenting the emerging situation of political persecution in Ecuador. On the one hand, the Human Rights Alliance reported assaults and detentions carried out by the State (continuing the reporting and legal action it undertook in 2019 and 2022). On the other, the monitoring carried out by the Coalition for Mapping State Repression, which during the 2022 uprising had tracked acts of state persecution and the mobilisations in support of the strike.

Despite their different methodologies, both sets of data documented an escalation in state violence from the very first day of the strike. The presence of the Vice-Presidency in Otavalo prompted a major military deployment in the demographic and symbolic capital of the Kichwa people which, from the outset, repressed the mobilisations through a novel form of direct repression against the peaceful marches and roadblocks of the Indigenous movement. The use of high-calibre bullets aimed at the bodies of demonstrators meant that, in the early days, numerous people were admitted to hospitals with gunshot wounds and extremely serious medical diagnoses.

A Government Determined to Kill

One of the first scenes that shook the country was the murder of Efraín Fueres, a Kichwa man from Cotacachi. CCTV footage showed soldiers shooting him and, far from providing medical assistance, beating the person who tried to help him and leaving both unconscious. The government initially denied the footage and later sought to justify it. In addition, twelve young Otavalo men who had been detained were reported missing and were eventually transferred to “maximum-security” prisons, where several prison massacres have taken place in recent years despite heavy militarisation. In the days that followed, detentions and violence were carried out against the marches in Quito, with particularly harsh images of repression against the Kichwa people of Saraguro in the southern highlands.

Repression spread throughout the country. In Saraguro (Loja), the elderly Kichwa woman Rosa Paqui died as a result of the indirect impact of tear gas canisters; and José Guamán, a Kichwa man from Otavalo (Imbabura), was killed by gunfire. There were also harrowing images of repression documented in Imbabura, including shots fired at people’s faces from only a few metres away as they called for an end to the violence, and the cutting of Indigenous protesters’ braided hair — a form of violence that recalls the era of hacienda slavery. As a stark display of the racism deployed by the State, the symbolic date of 12 October recorded the highest level of documented state repression.

The extensive military violence exercised, the government’s ability to tighten its grip on part of the social movements, and the turmoil caused by organised crime violence in Ecuador all contributed to the State’s greater capacity to counter the mobilisation in 2025.

The strike lasted 33 days, with 678 acts of mobilisation across the country’s 24 provinces and 78 of its 224 cantons.

According to the Coalition for Mapping Repression, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) added a series of demands to the strike: in addition to calling for the withdrawal of Decree 126, it demanded an end to extractive policies. Amid the state brutality unleashed in Otavalo, the strike intensified. The grassroots organisations of Otavalo, led by the Union of Peasant and Indigenous Organisations of Cotacachi (UNORCAC), rejected the contacts initiated by provincial leaders to bring the mobilisation to an end. The strike lasted 33 days, with 678 acts of mobilisation across the country’s 24 provinces and 78 of its 224 cantons.

Imbabura Province, where Otavalo is located, registered 226 actions, and Pichincha Province, where Quito and Cayambe are located, recorded 195. Unlike in 2019 and 2022, CONAIE ended the strike on 24 October without securing any measures from the Ecuadorian State. The extensive military violence exercised, the government’s ability to tighten its grip on part of the social movements, and the turmoil caused by organised crime violence in Ecuador all contributed to the State’s greater capacity to counter the mobilisation in 2025. The strike made it clear that Daniel Noboa’s government was set on securing constitutional change through military force.

To Halt Oligarchic Power

However, the strike led to a sharp drop in the president’s popularity, both because of rising transport costs and basic goods, and due to the discredit brought on by the military and police violence deployed. Despite the defeat, the popular response was immediate: as soon as the strike ended, the campaign against the Constitutional Referendum began. For his part, the president failed to demonstrate what would be different or superior about a new constitution. Noboa only explained that it would be drafted by “notable” figures (from the right wing and the oligarchies) and, in the final days, even mentioned the importance of ChatGPT in drafting the constitutional text.

Meanwhile, the government announced that new United States military bases would be installed in the Galápagos Islands. The news generated a wave of outrage given the memory of the destruction wrought by the US Army during the Second World War in Ecuador’s natural and symbolic emblem. Facing this, the government encountered a wide range of social sectors that carried out campaigns for the “NO”. Through various messages, the opposition managed to mobilise the entire electorate with remarkable originality.

The result was a democratic rejection of President Daniel Noboa by more than 60% of the electorate—and consequently, of his political proposals, which combine oligarchic neoliberalism, patriarchal authoritarianism and fascist militarism. The strike and the referendum show that the only way to halt the absolute power of the elites who govern the country is through the articulation of popular sectors together with the peoples and nationalities of Ecuador.

The post Ecuador: Between Oligarchic Violence and Popular Majorities appeared first on Debates Indígenas.

This explains why IBE has been a central demand of the political agenda of Indigenous organizations, and why it has consistently played a key role in political negotiations with the Ecuadorian state. This was especially evident during the Dialogue Tables held in 2022, following the major Indigenous uprising in June of that year.

Historical Trajectory of Intercultural Bilingual Education

The emergence of Intercultural Bilingual Education in Ecuador dates back to the 1940s, when the Clandestine Schools of Cayambe were established by Dolores Cacuango and the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians, with the goal of teaching literacy to children and youth from communities working on local haciendas. In the decades that followed, various educational initiatives sprang up across the Highlands, the Amazon, and even parts of the Coast.

A defining feature of these initiatives was their autonomous nature: they were created and operated independently of the state and managed directly by the communities themselves. Another important aspect was their commitment to creative and innovative educational approaches—both in terms of content and methodology—aimed at addressing the needs and aspirations of Indigenous communities.

In 1988, as a result of pressure from the Indigenous movement and negotiations with the government of the time, Indigenous education was officially recognized by the Ecuadorian state through Executive Decree 203. Thismilestone led to the creation of the National Directorate of Intercultural Bilingual Education (DINEIB), with the aim of enabling Indigenous peoples and nations, through their organizations, to lead, plan, and manage Indigenous education comprehensively at the national level.

Over the course of more than three decades of institutional life, Intercultural Bilingual Education (IBE) has made significant progress in several areas, including teacher training, curriculum development, and the production of educational materials. However, it has also faced serious challenges and setbacks. The vitality and progress of IBE have depended not only on the priority Indigenous organizations assign to it within their political agendas, but also on the vision and political will of successive governments.

The Current Landscape: Limited Presence in Urban Areas

There is no available data on the quality of Intercultural Bilingual Education in Ecuador, as reports from the National Institute for Educational Evaluation (INEVAL) do not differentiate learning outcomes between the two educational jurisdictions: intercultural (formerly “Hispanic jurisdiction”) and intercultural bilingual. Furthermore, there are no specific criteria for assessing the quality of IBE.

In terms of coverage, IBE currently serves 131,282 students across the three educational levels—early childhood, primary, and secondary—which represents only 3.12% of the country’s total student population. This figure is a cause of concern, particularly in a country where 7.7% of the population identifies as Indigenous.

While 80% of students enrolled in IBE identify themselves as Indigenous, the remaining students identify themselves as mestizo, Afro-descendant, montubio, or white. Among Indigenous students, the majority belong to the Kichwa and Shuar nations (64.73% and 24.12%, respectively), the two largest Indigenous groups in Ecuador. They are followed, in smaller numbers, by students from the Chachi, Achuar, and Awa nations, with other groups represented in minimal percentages.

A related issue is that most IBE students in Ecuador live in rural areas—70.49%. This reflects the fact that 73.87% of the Indigenous population resides in rural areas and also points to one of the current weaknesses of IBE: its limited presence in urban areas.

One notable characteristic that distinguishes Ecuador from other countries in the region is that IBE has a nationwide reach: it operates in 23 of the country’s 24 provinces, including the Galápagos Islands, where sustained Indigenous migration has occurred over several decades. Most IBE students are concentrated in the Amazon and the central Highlands.

Finally, it is important to note that to attend its students, the IBE program currently employs 9,146 teachers working in 1,710 educational institutions of various types (early childhood, primary, secondary, and mixed), sizes, and conditions. The majority are located in rural areas.

Structure of the Educational Proposal

In Ecuador, Intercultural Bilingual Education is based on the Intercultural Bilingual Education System Model, developed by Indigenous peoples and approved in 1993—five years after the state recognized Indigenous education. This model clearly defines the principles, goals, foundations, and strategies of IBE, as well as various criteria for organizing and implementing the educational process, including the academic calendar, language use, classroom methodology, and learning assessment.

IBE is organized into two levels: intercultural bilingual basic education and intercultural bilingual secondary education. The basic level includes two stages: the non-formal stage, which involves family- and community-based early childhood education; and the formal stage, comprising the first ten years of schooling. The formal stage is structured around four sequential processes: introduction to semiotic systems; cognitive, emotional, and psychomotor development; development of academic and technical skills; and investigative learning. The secondary level, or intercultural bilingual high school, includes the final three years before entry into higher education.

Each level of education has its own specific curriculum, approved in 2017. These are adapted versions of the national curriculum. For the basic level, there are 14 specific curricula—one for each Indigenous nation. For the high school level, a unified proposal called Curricular Extension for the Intercultural Bilingual Unified General Baccalaureate was developed to complement the contents of the national curriculum.

The Challenges of a Self-Determined Education

The most pressing challenge today is the issue of autonomy: the right and power of Indigenous nations to define their own education according to their needs and political visions. This is a basic condition for the development of an education that is culturally, linguistically, socially, and politically relevant. Indigenous organizations are working to restore the status they held until 2008, when they had control over appointing authorities, designing curricula, managing the educational process, and training their own teachers. Achieving educational autonomy is a key component of the plurinationality recognized in the Ecuadorian Constitution.

A second major challenge is the need to rethink the curricular proposals. Although there are curricula specifically for IBE, they are ultimately adaptations of what is misleadingly called the “national curriculum,” which in reality reflects the worldview and context of the urban, white-mestizo, middle class. The Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador (CONAIE) advocates for the development of curricula that respond to the current needs and realities of Indigenous peoples and that support the realization of their political projects.

In recent years, several promising curricular proposals have emerged from different areas in the Highlands and the Amazon. These experiences could serve as valuable references for and contributions to the current process of reform. Naturally, any curriculum reform initiative must be sufficiently flexible to incorporate both core areas of shared learning and the specific needs of Indigenous peoples and nations. This goes beyond language and culture—it also includes organizational, territorial, and political dimensions.

A third major challenge relates to teacher training. Although significant progress has been made over the past three decades, much remains to be done. The challenge lies not only in increasing the number of teachers with specific intercultural profiles, but also in expanding representation from all Indigenous nations. Currently, the majority of teachers in the Intercultural Bilingual Education (IBE) system are from the Kichwa nation (70.95%), followed by Shuar teachers (18.76%). However, there are very few teachers from the other nations.

Inter-institutional coordination and the production of educational materials

Addressing the challenge above requires coordinated efforts among Ecuadorian universities, the Intercultural Bilingual Education System, and Indigenous organizations. The goal is to develop a strong, sustainable teacher training program that acknowledges the internal diversity of Indigenous populations, with special attention to nations with fewer educators.

Closely linked to this is the challenge of producing educational resources and materials. Despite the work carried out over the past thirty years, there is still a shortage of materials in Indigenous languages that reflect the unique cultural, social, and political realities of each people and nation.

Last—but certainly not least—is the challenge of reaching new generations of Indigenous people living in urban areas. The IBE currently being offered in urban contexts is limited, while the rural-to-urban migration trend continues to grow. Addressing the needs of urban Indigenous youth calls for a rethinking of many of the principles that originally shaped and sustained IBE, and for adapting the system to the new educational demands of these populations.

It is also important to consider Indigenous populations living abroad. Migration is an ongoing and increasingly widespread phenomenon that appears to be irreversible. The advances in virtual education in recent years—particularly following the pandemic—could offer significant opportunities for delivering education to Ecuadorian Indigenous communities living outside the country.

The post In Search of Autonomy: History, Current Realities, and Challenges of Intercultural Bilingual Education in Ecuador appeared first on Debates Indígenas.