A decade later, under the government of Luis Arce Catacora, Plurinational Constitutional Court Ruling No. 0040/2024 declared the prohibition on the commodification of environmental functions unconstitutional, ordering the removal of the relevant provisions of Law No. 300 from the legal framework. The Court justified its decision by arguing that the prohibition conflicted with a number of international agreements and rights, including the primacy of international treaties (such as the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol), the right to trade, freedom of enterprise, and the right to a healthy environment. However, the ruling failed to establish minimum guarantees or safeguards to protect Indigenous Peoples’ rights and territorial rights.

The removal of the prohibition paved the way for carbon markets in Bolivia, allowing access to international climate finance mechanisms. Against this backdrop, the government of Luis Arce Catacora issued Supreme Decree No. 5264, establishing guidelines for the management of and access to climate finance. These included the creation of the National Registry of Programmes and Projects (RENAPP), the introduction of Emission Reduction Units, and provisions defining the State’s role in channelling climate finance.

Private Interests in Indigenous Territories

State efforts to regulate carbon markets are advancing along two parallel tracks. On the one hand, the Chamber of Deputies is promoting Bill No. 060/2025–2026, on the Regulation of the Market for Greenhouse Gas Emission Credits and Allowances. On the other, the Vice-Ministry of Environment, Biodiversity, Climate Change, and Forest Management and Development is drafting the Framework Bill on the Regulation and Coordination of Climate and Biodiversity Finance. While the Framework Bill remains in the early stages of development, the Carbon Markets Bill is already set to be debated by the full Chamber of Deputies. This haste highlights a lack of planning and coordination.

Although both state bodies have held information-sharing sessions with the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB), Indigenous organisations have repeatedly called for compliance with international standards and respect for their own rules and procedures before any legislative debate takes place. Nevertheless, given the State’s institutional track record, there are concerns that it will bypass the requirement for Free, Prior and Informed Consultation in accordance with Indigenous Peoples’ own rules and procedures, thereby violating their constitutional and collective rights.

Indigenous Peoples of the Lowlands, whose territories cover vast areas of land, now face the imminent risk of being subjected to decisions driven by party-political interests and the agro-industrial sector’s pursuit of capital accumulation.

Indigenous Peoples of the Lowlands, whose territories cover vast areas of land, now face the imminent risk of being subjected to decisions driven by party-political interests and the agro-industrial sector’s pursuit of capital accumulation.

The bills promoted by the Government and business interests seek to generate profits in the name of Indigenous Peoples and the Amazon. In this regard, David Quiroga, President of the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples of the Tropics of Cochabamba (CPITCO), states: “The national Government, through its ministers and those around them, sees carbon credits as a business opportunity. Incredibly, government officials themselves are setting up their own NGOs, foundations and intermediary organisations because they see an opportunity to make money. They want to profit in the name of Indigenous Peoples, the Amazon, and our forests. I find this unacceptable.”

Indigenous Peoples of the Lowlands, whose territories cover vast areas of land, now face the imminent risk of being subjected to decisions driven by party-political interests and the agro-industrial sector’s pursuit of capital accumulation. In this regard, Manuel Gonzales of CIDOB warned: “As Indigenous Peoples, we are up against political forces, private businesses and the Government, and we often find ourselves alone. We need allies to confront this struggle, because it could turn into a full-scale dispute over our territories.”

Failed Carbon Credit Initiatives and the Lack of Transparency

Experts have identified a wide range of actors involved, highlighting the participation of national and international private companies, state institutions, intermediary organisations and multilateral partnerships: the LEAF Coalition, Green Carbon, Bluegrace Energy Bolivia, the Federico Hecker Foundation, Green Oxygen SRL, Laconic Infrastructure Partners (SADAR), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the Natura Bolivia Foundation.

These organisations play strategic roles in the development of carbon credit projects, including the design, financing, implementation, and management of initiatives aimed at mitigating, reducing, or removing greenhouse gas emissions. In practice, however, the implementation of carbon projects in Bolivia has led only to frustration and a lack of transparency. Expert Miguel Vargas recalled that the pilot project in Noel Kempff Mercado National Park, managed by the Fundación Amigos de la Naturaleza (FAN) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC), failed to secure the sale of carbon credits due to “the lack of a government signature and regulatory gaps”.

Regarding the lack of transparency in contractual arrangements, researcher Stasiek Czaplicki points to several private projects promoted by intermediary companies, such as Green Carbon, in Indigenous territories across Bolivia. These include the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS), the Monte Verde Indigenous Community Land, the Multiethnic Indigenous Territory (TIM II), Isoso and Lomerío, with contracts spanning 35 to 100 years. These agreements involve the full transfer of carbon rights and submission to private commercial arbitration bodies, such as the Chamber of Industry, Commerce, Services, and Tourism of Santa Cruz (CAINCO). Furthermore, the lack of information available to communities undermines their right to self-government and self-determination in decisions concerning their territories.

Finally, the bills driven by business interests seek to circumvent social consensus and strict compliance with constitutional and international standards on Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation (FPIC). Francisco Maza, of the Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni (CPEM-B), stressed the need to address both consultation and consent: “We must work on free, prior and informed consultation, including consent, and on planning from within our own territories. We have to be part of this entire process. This mechanism is going to be implemented, but the question is: where do we stand? We cannot simply wait until everything has been approved before making our voices heard.”

Contradictions in Bolivia’s Legal Framework

The debate over the unviability of carbon credits in Bolivia persists due to structural risks and vulnerabilities associated with the country’s legal framework. These include the so-called “fire laws”, Nos. 337, 741 and 1171, which facilitate burning and place pressure on forests and Indigenous territories without imposing significant penalties. Between 2016 and 2025, nearly 50 million hectares of land were burned in Bolivia, highlighting the persistence of this environmental and territorial problem. The scale of these fires has made Bolivia the country with the second-largest burned area in Latin America.

In this regard, Czaplicki explains: “First, there must be a functioning national forest management programme that serves as the primary source of funding, with carbon credits playing a complementary role. Second, there must be genuine disincentives to deforestation. This means that penalties must be high enough to ensure that deforestation is no longer profitable, even when fines are imposed. Third, there must be a comprehensive and effective fire management strategy focused on prevention and firefighting. Unless these conditions are met, it will be very difficult for carbon projects to function researcher Cassandra Smithies emphasises: “Companies pay to gain access to forests, obtain their carbon credits and continue polluting.properly, as shortcomings remain in all three areas.”

Researcher Cassandra Smithies emphasises: “Companies pay to gain access to forests, obtain their carbon credits and continue polluting”.

Researcher Cassandra Smithies emphasises: “Companies pay to gain access to forests, obtain their carbon credits and continue polluting”.

This contradiction between the legal framework and the State’s institutional weaknesses is compounded by the economic paradox of carbon markets. The sale of carbon credits would finance the conservation of forests and Indigenous territories by selling emission rights to highly polluting transnational corporations, such as oil, mining, and logging companies. In this way, large corporations are able to shift their environmental responsibility onto the Global South, including Indigenous Peoples who protect their territories.

On this point, researcher Cassandra Smithies emphasises: “Companies pay to gain access to forests, obtain their carbon credits and continue polluting. The key is to understand that carbon markets can lead to territorial dispossession and constitute a false solution to climate change, as companies continue exploiting resources and polluting.” Smithies therefore stresses the importance of asking: “Who is behind REDD? Who is promoting the REDD mechanism, carbon markets and these false solutions? The very same oil, mining and logging companies, alongside some conservation NGOs that ultimately facilitate the interests of extractive industries.”

Warnings, Threats and Concerns Regarding Carbon Market Regulation

Over the past six months, various national and international actors have pursued strategies aimed at promoting legal certainty, attracting investment, and facilitating access to climate finance mechanisms and carbon markets. The central government, departmental governments in eastern Bolivia (Pando, Beni and Santa Cruz), the business sector and conservation NGOs have used a range of communication channels, including social media, official communications and alternative media, to shape public perceptions of the “opportunities” offered by green economy projects.

However, even as concerns grow over these promises, the proposed Regulation of the Market for Greenhouse Gas Emission Credits and Allowances raises several fundamental concerns. During the International Interorganisational Meeting of Indigenous Peoples on the Climate Crisis and Climate Finance, following extensive reflection and debate on experiences in Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, participants identified a number of preliminary warnings and threats:

• Lack of transparency and the imposition of state and corporate interests in the development of failed carbon credit projects.
• Absence of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation (FPIC), with government authorities and intermediaries passing off mere information-sharing activities as genuine consultation processes.
• Territorial fragmentation and the co-option of local actors by intermediaries promoting carbon markets in Indigenous territories.
• Pressure from external actors seeking to benefit from carbon projects, creating divisions and parallel organisational structures that weaken social cohesion and territorial governance.
• Economic disparities and mistrust of intermediaries and the distribution of revenue generated by carbon credits, as most of the proceeds remain within the state bureaucracy or in the hands of intermediaries.
• Abusive contractual arrangements imposed by intermediary companies through opaque, long-term agreements (30 to 100 years), posing risks of territorial dispossession or the transfer of rights that could restrict territorial self-government.
• Weaknesses within some national and regional Indigenous organisational structures due to political party and government interference, prompting calls to revise their statutes to protect organisations from unfavourable carbon credit projects.

Consequently, during the meeting, Indigenous organisations, together with local and international specialists, proposed the following measures to ensure that decisions are made autonomously, on the basis of adequate information and without harming their territories:

• Indigenous organisations consider it urgent to establish their own Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and Consent protocols, tailored to each Indigenous People, to define territorial rules before entering into any negotiations.
• All public and private initiatives must disclose their gross costs, benefit-sharing plans, and voluntary withdrawal clauses. Forest conservation in Bolivia must not become a means of undermining Indigenous Peoples’ self-government and self-determination.
• Carbon credits must not be presented as an economic lifeline that creates false expectations, but rather as a contested arena in which territorial sovereignty is at stake.
• Indigenous Peoples agree on the need to defend self-government, binding Free, Prior and Informed Consultation and direct control over resources to prevent carbon markets from becoming a new form of green neo-extractivism and territorial dispossession.
• The need to strengthen legal self-defence mechanisms and develop proposals establishing non-negotiable minimum requirements to safeguard Indigenous Peoples’ self-government and self-determination.

The post State and Private Interests Behind Carbon Markets in Bolivia appeared first on Debates Indígenas.

Further, the 2025 End-of-Year Report from the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) recorded 135 cases of Indigenous territory dispossession, up from 121 cases the year before. The mining sector accounted for the most cases, with 69 incidents affecting 1.06 million hectares. The plantation sector caused the most widespread damage, covering 1.95 million hectares. Indigenous communities lost 3.8 million hectares of their ancestral territories that year, and authorities criminalized 162 Indigenous people for defending their living space.

There are generally three interlocking mechanisms which are driving both ecological damage and violations of Indigenous Peoples’ rights: Legislation reduces ecological reality to administrative categories such as state forests and industrial zones; Development extractivism treats nature as a capital that must be exploited. The Mineral and Coal Mining Law, the Plantation Law, and the Job Creation Law form the legal basis for mining and palm oil expansion. Further, conservation and climate policy that exclude participation often repeat the same extractivist patterns. Carbon markets lock up Indigenous forests through bans on access, cultivation shifts, and firewood gathering.

These three mechanisms converge on one point: the bodies of Indigenous women, who tend and care for their lands and communities every day.

The Burden that Lands on Indigenous Women’s Bodies

Indigenous women fetch water, gather firewood, harvest medicinal plants, and tend to rotational gardens. When ecosystems break down, this work grows heavier and riskier. When rivers become polluted, women have to walk farther to find clean water. When the forests disappear, medicinal plants disappear with them, so women care for sick family members without the remedies they normally use.

Ecosystem damage also correlates with health problems. Women near coal mines in East Kalimantan have reported that dust from mine haul roads disrupts their menstrual cycles and their children’s health. Water contaminated with heavy metals causes skin infections and reproductive disorders. Environmental Impact Assessments (AMDAL) rarely capture this data as they measure water quality standards and emission limits rather than women’s domestic workload or reproductive health.

In many territories, when forests are turned into monoculture plantations, women lose their income from non-timber forest products, and their positions within the household weaken.

When forests are turned into monoculture plantations, women lose their income from non-timber forest products, and their positions within the household weaken.

Ecosystem damage also negatively interferes with the transmission of Indigenous ecological knowledge. Indigenous women have obtained knowledge about fruiting seasons, animal migration cycles, and the location of medicinal plants through direct observation over generations. In the Rejang, Serawai, and Malin Deman Indigenous territories in Bengkulu, Indigenous women identify hundreds of forest plant species as food and medicine. When the forests are cleared for plantations or mines, the younger generations lose the chance to learn this knowledge firsthand.

Lastly, Indigenous territories also serve as spaces for women’s ritual life and economic activity.  In many territories, when forests are turned into monoculture plantations, women lose their source of income from non-timber forest products, and their position within the household weaken.

The Climate Crisis Deepens the Double Burden

The biodiversity and climate crises are connected. Deforestation releases carbon stored in the forests and peatlands, which accelerates global warming. Indigenous women bear the brunt of the impacts from both crises. As forests disappear, the land loses its capacity to store water. Dry seasons grow drier, and rainy seasons bring a higher risk of flooding. Women responsible for household water must walk farther during the dry seasons on top of dealing with gardens suffering from damages, as well as contaminated water, during the rainy seasons.

Shifts in planting seasons also disrupt women’s Indigenous knowledge of ecological indicators. When seasonal patterns become unpredictable, harvests decline. In many Indigenous households, women reduce their own food portions first to ensure that their children have enough to eat. Carbon market schemes add new risks. These schemes require large forest areas, and as a direct consequence such schemes often impose access restrictions. As such, Indigenous women’s needs for shifting cultivation, resin, and firewood remain further disrespected.

Ecosystem damage also threatens keystone species that form part of Indigenous women’s knowledge systems. The Sumatran tiger, orangutan, and elephant lose their habitats as forests are converted into palm oil plantations and mines. For Indigenous women, the presence of certain species indicates forest and water quality levels. When those species disappear, women lose the tools they use daily to read and understand their environment.

Women and the Recovery of the Commons

Indigenous women do not only carry the burden. They are the keepers of seeds, they are leaders of agrarian resistance, and they build conservation practices rooted in Indigenous knowledge. The Kendeng Indigenous women, for example, printed their feet in cement in front of the State Palace to oppose a cement factory in the Kendeng Mountains, then continued their advocacy through independent monitoring of spring water quality and flow. Papuan women resisted the expansion of a large-scale food estate project in Merauke, while documenting sago-processing knowledge so it would not disappear.

In Bengkulu, Rejang women store local rice seeds between planting seasons as a living gene bank, while maintaining garden rotation that restores soil fertility. In Merpas and Linau Villages, along the south Bengkulu coastal area, women avoid destructive fishing gear and have agreed on spawning zones in the lagoon. These practices show that conservation does not require removing people from protected areas. Conservation grounded in Indigenous women’s knowledge works through active involvement rather than restricted access.

Commoning Movement builds solidarity among Indigenous women’s communities, works with legal partners, and advocates for policies that require Indigenous women’s Free, Prior and Informed Consent.

Commoning Movement builds solidarity among Indigenous women’s communities, works with legal partners such as Akar Law Office.

Akar Global Initiative developed the Rebuilding the Commons framework to strengthen women’s contributions across four dimensions. Commoning Land restores Indigenous land as a jointly managed space through participatory mapping, restoration based on local species, and collective governance that includes Indigenous women as decision-makers. Commoning Care recognizes women’s care work as ecological labour, supported by clean water infrastructure, documentation of care work, and reproductive health services in affected areas.

Commoning Culture restores ritual practice and Indigenous ecological knowledge through oral documentation and intergenerational education programs, so that younger generations receive elder women’s knowledge before it disappears. Commoning Movement builds solidarity among Indigenous women’s communities, collaborates with legal partners such as Akar Law Office, and advocates for policies that require Indigenous women’s Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) for every permit necessary for mining, plantation, and energy. These four dimensions support one another.

Challenges on the Ground

This collective action framework faces three concrete challenges. In many regions, customary structures still place men as the community’s representatives, so formal engagement of Indigenous women often meets resistance. Government and international donor conservation programs still measure success by protected area size or stored carbon volume rather than measuring the impacts on Indigenous women’s living conditions. Without a change in the aforementioned indicators, Indigenous women’s contributions remain officially unrecognized. Pressure from mining expansion and national strategic projects also keeps rising each year, so community-based recovery keeps facing new threats whose scale exceeds what Indigenous communities can respond to alone.

In turn, biodiversity and ecosystem restoration and recovery require legal change, not only technical rehabilitation programs. Environmental impact assessments need to include body-level indicators, such as the distance Indigenous women travel to find clean water and the number of medicinal plants lost from their daily access radius. Legal frameworks need to recognize Indigenous women’s ecological knowledge of seasons, seeds, and ecological indicators as equal to formal scientific studies, through a mechanism that requires Indigenous women’s Free, Prior and Informed Consent as a condition for valid permits.

Indonesia’s biodiversity and deforestation crises are not isolated technical problems. This damage lands hardest on Indigenous women, who fetch water, keep seeds, and carry out the ecological rituals.

Indonesia’s biodiversity and deforestation crises are not isolated technical problems. This damage lands hardest on Indigenous women, who fetch water, keep seeds, and carry out the ecological rituals.

Environmental law paradigms also need to shift from state sovereignty over natural resources toward shared governance, where Indigenous women act as decision-makers, not merely consultation participants. Ecological justice requires reparation, not just financial compensation. This means returning Indigenous land, water sources, ritual spaces, and lost species, paired with ecological regeneration programs led by Indigenous women.

Indonesia’s biodiversity and deforestation crises are not isolated technical problems. This damage lands hardest on Indigenous women, who fetch water, keep seeds, and carry out the ecological rituals that bind their communities to nature every day. Indonesia’s biodiversity recovery will only succeed once policy recognizes Indigenous women as primary agents of recovery, not passive beneficiaries of conservation programs designed without their involvement.

The post Indigenous Women’s Struggle: Facing the Biodiversity Crisis and Deforestation Burden in Indonesia appeared first on Debates Indígenas.

In other words, governments will face an exam to answer a simple but decisive question for the health of the Earth: are they really doing what they promised to halt the destruction of nature and restore lost biodiversity? Bolivia is one of the countries expected to show what it has done. Before facing that exam, at COP17 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), to be held in Yerevan, Armenia, from October 19 to 30, 2026, countries first had to account for their progress. They did so through their Seventh National Reports (7NR), in which each government details the measures it has taken and the results it has achieved.

The deadline was February 28, 2026. These reports will provide input for the first global review of collective progress. Bolivia also submitted its report, a document that makes it possible to reconstruct—from the State’s official account—the progress it claims to have made and the difficulties it acknowledges.

The Great Challenge

In 2022, during COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, countries adopted the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework and laid out a roadmap toward a world living in harmony with nature by 2050. To meet that challenge, they established 23 targets for 2030 that not only commit governments to halting biodiversity loss, but also place Indigenous Peoples and local communities at the center—as rights holders and essential actors in the conservation of their territories and ways of life.

This relationship between conservation and Indigenous rights runs throughout the Framework. It is particularly evident in Targets 1 and 3. The first calls for spatial planning that reduces the loss of areas of importance for biodiversity while respecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Target 3, known as the 30×30 target, establishes that conservation of at least 30% of the planet’s lands and waters must respect these peoples’ rights over their traditional territories. The message is clear: biodiversity conservation cannot be separated from Indigenous Peoples. So, what has Bolivia done over the past four years to fulfill the commitments it made?

If Indigenous territories are part of Bolivia’s strategy to conserve biodiversity, what is actually happening to their forests in the face of deforestation, land encroachment, and the other pressures the State itself acknowledges?

If Indigenous territories are part of Bolivia’s strategy to conserve biodiversity, what is actually happening to their forests?

In its Seventh National Report, prepared by the General Directorate of Biodiversity and Protected Areas, the Bolivian State maintains that Indigenous territories form part of its conservation strategy. Without providing any figures, the document reports progress in the titling of new Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs) / Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos (TIOCs), the development of life plans, and the strengthening of Indigenous forms of governance. It also highlights the creation of conservation areas under Indigenous management, as well as initiatives in forest management, sustainable use, restoration, and territorial monitoring.

But the same report points to a more complex picture. Bolivia acknowledges land encroachment, conflicts over land use and overlapping rights, as well as pressures stemming from extractive activities, agricultural expansion, and illegal settlements. It also admits difficulties in updating and harmonizing life plans and, above all, a lack of information to measure land-use change and land tenure in ancestral territories and local communities. The Document states: “No Data Available”.

The paradox is significant. Bolivia presents Indigenous territories as key to conservation and to the international target of protecting at least 30% of the planet’s lands and waters. Yet when it comes to showing what is actually happening within those territories, the State itself acknowledges that it still lacks the data needed to report on one of the indicators established by the Global Biodiversity Framework. If Indigenous territories are part of Bolivia’s strategy to conserve biodiversity, what is actually happening to their forests in the face of deforestation, land encroachment, and the other pressures the State itself acknowledges?

Forests Under Pressure

An investigation by Amazonía Traficada—a journalism project supported by the Pulitzer Center, Mongabay Latam, RAI Bolivia, and Asuntos Centrales—used satellite data to examine a key region for conservation: Bolivia’s Indigenous Amazon. The investigation analyzed deforestation within 48 titled Indigenous territories in Bolivia’s Amazon basin and found that, between 1986 and 2024, these ancestral territories suffered a cumulative loss of 257,000 hectares of forest. That figure represents 3.4% of the 7.6 million hectares deforested in Bolivia during the same period.

To determine how much of that deforestation was legally authorized, the investigation cross-referenced the data with forest-clearing permits issued by the Authority for the Social Oversight and Control of Forests and Land (ABT) between 2003 and 2023. Records show that, over those two decades, the institution authorized the clearing of nearly 80,000 hectares of forest in 41 Indigenous territories. Yet only 17,900 hectares within those authorized areas actually lost their forest cover. Most of the forest loss occurred outside areas where clearing had been authorized.

In other words, between 2003 and 2023, 168,670 hectares were deforested in areas without authorization. The ratio gives a sense of the scale of the problem: for every hectare cleared within an authorized area, more than nine were cleared outside authorized areas. In other words, nearly 90% of the forest loss recorded in Amazonian Indigenous territories during that period occurred outside State authorization mechanisms. The pressure on these territories is part of a nationwide trend. A World Resources Institute (WRI) report shows that in 2025 Bolivia once again ranked second in the world for primary forest loss, behind only Brazil.

A Territorial Struggle with No End in Sight

The pressure on Indigenous territories is not limited to forests. It also extends to land tenure and the legal security of these territories. In its Seventh National Report, Bolivia states that it has expanded the area covered by TCOs/TIOCs through new land titles, although it does not specify how many hectares were incorporated.

However, cross-referencing data from research conducted by the Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social (CEJIS) and the Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) shows that the struggle of Lowland Indigenous Peoples for the recognition, titling, and defense of their ancestral territories is far from over.

While much of this territorial demand remains unresolved, the State has continued allocating land to third parties in areas bordering Indigenous territories.

While much of this territorial demand remains unresolved, the State has continued allocating land to third parties in areas bordering Indigenous territories.

From the 1990s through the first decades of the twenty-first century, the 48 Indigenous territories in the Amazon basin collectively requested legal recognition of around 22.7 million hectares. Yet the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA) titled only 11.7 million hectares—just 52% of the area claimed. In other words, more than 11 million hectares were left outside the titling process.

While much of this territorial demand remains unresolved, the State has continued allocating land to third parties in areas bordering Indigenous territories. Between 2009 and 2019, INRA allocated approximately 318,500 hectares for the establishment of 236 intercultural and campesino communities, whose social organizations were aligned with the political party that governed Bolivia between 2006 and 2025.

When Protection Is Not Enough

The gap between the protection the State says it provides and what actually happens within Indigenous territories also appears in the Seventh National Report itself. Bolivia acknowledges that it lacks information to measure, amongst other things, land tenure in the ancestral territories of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It also acknowledges problems of land grabbing and illegal tenure.

These ancestral peoples face pressure from third-party communities settled around their titled territories with authorization from the National Institute for Agrarian Reform. But they also face land grabbing within areas legally recognized by the State—that is, territories for which they hold collective title.

While Indigenous communities denounce land grabbing and State institutions take months—even years—to act, the trees keep falling and Indigenous territories keep being trafficked.

While Indigenous communities denounce land grabbing and State institutions take months—even years—to act, the trees keep falling and Indigenous territories keep being trafficked.

An analysis of interviews with leaders from 30 of the 48 titled Indigenous territories in the Amazon basin concludes that 28 of these ancestral territories have experienced land grabbing over the past two decades and that, in 22 cases, the conflicts remain unresolved. According to the leaders interviewed, behind these occupations are networks seeking to fuel an illicit land market in the Bolivian Amazon, primarily to open up land for large-scale agricultural activities.

While Indigenous communities denounce land grabbing and State institutions take months—even years—to act, the trees keep falling and Indigenous territories keep being trafficked. But this is not the only pressure. The 30 Indigenous leaders also identified conflicts and threats linked to carbon markets, illegal mining, timber trafficking, and drug trafficking.

Conserving Beyond the Map

In Yerevan, Bolivia will have to show how much progress it has made toward 30×30. It will be able to talk about titled territories, Indigenous governance, and conservation under Indigenous management. Yet behind those figures are territories where trees continue to fall, where disputes over land persist, and where Indigenous communities wait years for the State to respond to land grabbing and the trafficking of their lands.

30×30 may look achievable when viewed on a map. But conservation does not happen on a map. It happens in real territories, where Indigenous Peoples defend their forests, their rights, and their ways of life. The unresolved issue Bolivia will take to COP17 is not simply how many hectares it can declare conserved, but how much of what it says it protects is actually safe—and how effectively it can halt or control the pressures it acknowledges in its own Seventh National Report: the expansion of the agricultural frontier, extractive activities, and human settlements as major drivers of biodiversity loss and deforestation.

In other words, beyond the exam it must sit in October, the Bolivian State—regardless of who happens to be the current occupant of power in La Paz—must be capable of enforcing the rules it has created and guaranteeing the protection of the forests and of those who inhabit these ancestral lands. This is not only an obligation to Bolivians. It is also a responsibility to a planet that no longer has time to wait for promises to become action.

The post 30×30 and Indigenous Territories: Bolivia’s Contradiction appeared first on Debates Indígenas.

The territorial boundaries of Taung Pat Lal are demarcated by natural geographical landmarks, including the Tho Doe The Loe creek, Chein Loe Yo (Tiger Creek), El Bra Loe Chee, Chein Loe Htit (Tiger Rock), Thaw Kha Loe Chee, and the ridges of Yae Ka Hday and Kyar Mwe mountains. Within these boundary markers, the community manages a sophisticated zoning system that seamlessly integrates food production, biodiversity conservation, and spiritual protection. Rotational agricultural lands (Shwe Pyaung Taung Ya), family-managed perennial agroforestry orchards, and communal and sacred lands such as protected watershed areas and sacred sites including the Prayer Mountain (Su Taung Taung), a Marian Grotto (Mae Taw Gu), and community cemetery grounds takes part of the community managed zoning system.

Customary land tenure is governed equitably. Inheritance of family orchards and land is granted equally between daughters and sons without gender discrimination. Land boundaries are respected through customary oral agreements and natural landmarks. To safeguard ancestral territories from external land-grabbing, customary rules prohibit selling inherited lands to outsiders from distant areas. If a family must transfer land, it must remain with relatives or community members. Dispute resolution is overseen by village elders, local leaders, and religious figures, terminating in traditional reconciliation practices, such as symbolic handshakes and collective prayers.

Indigenous Knowledge and Ecosystem Conservation

The conservation value of Indigenous lands comes directly from deep-rooted Indigenous ecological knowledge passed down across generations. In Taung Pat Lal, customary resource management contains mechanisms that regulate extraction and protect forest fauna and flora:

1. Agro-biodiversity and biological pest control

In rotational rice plots, Gheba Karen farmers practice agro-farming by planting Phor Li Phor Par (cockscomb flowers) along rice field margins. These vibrant flowers attract insects away from the rice, providing natural biological control that minimizes crop damage without the use of chemical pesticides and underpins the  importance of Indigenous customary knowledge. Furthermore, rotational plots host a diverse mix of food crops, preserving a genetic bank of resilient local plants and species.

2. Seed-keeping and leadership of Indigenous women

Women (Maetaw Thami) play a crucial role in maintaining agro-biodiversity. Following harvest, women carefully select, sun-dry, and smoke inherited seeds over kitchen households to protect them from insects, storing them safely for the next planting season. Customary rituals reinforce seed purity. When transferring harvested grain to the family granary, a handful of rice and a bouquet of flowers are tied to the main house post throughout the year, ensuring that the spirit of the crops (Saba Leik Pyar) remains tied to the land and is replanted in the spring.

3. Sustainable harvesting rules

The community enforces strict seasonal and biological guidelines for harvesting Non-Timber Forest Products. Bamboo shoots (Myit) are vital for living and livelihoods, with families harvesting bamboo shoots seasonally while maintaining root stock integrity. Medicinal plants such as Bhon Ma Ra Za roots and wild orchids are extracted selectively to prevent depletion.

4. Indigenous herbal heritage and practice

The Gheba Karen Affairs Committee and local youth documented a comprehensive collection of medicinal plants. Local Indigenous healers rely on species like Dwi Yin Kaung (a wild forest fern), which is crushed into a poultice with sesame oil, turmeric, and local binders to treat severe bone fractures and tissue injuries. Other wild forest species, such as Yae Yin Pyar leaves, wild jackfruit leaves, and ginger roots, are used for post-natal care and treating physical trauma.

Increasing Threats: Conflict, Destruction, and Climate Vulnerability

Despite these sustainable practices, Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar’s tropical forests face escalating structural threats that endanger both their rights and their ecosystems.

1. Escalating conflict and human rights violations

The operational environment in Kayin (Karen) State is defined by intense military conflict and displacement. Across Thantaunggyi Township and neighboring Leiktho, civilian populations endure frequent airstrikes, heavy artillery shelling, and village burnings by military regime resulting in thousands displaced across the Thantaunggyi / Leiktho regional corridor. Reports document severe casualties, including regime airstrikes on April 29, 2026 in Thantaunggyi that killed 20 civilians, alongside widespread destruction of homes. Thousands of residents remain internally displaced in forest zones, unable to return to burned down villages. These conditions prevent regular agricultural cycles and threaten human security. Moreover, Indigenous Gheba Karen communities are also bearing the burden of sheltering and accommodating other internally displaced people from Bago Region, further straining their resources and resilience. The ongoing violence not only devastates lives and property but also hinders long-term development and stability in the region. Urgent international attention and support are needed to address these crises, protect civilian lives, and promote sustainable peace and recovery efforts.

2. Loss of biodiversity and Indigenous knowledge

Deforestation and habitat destruction intensified by historical commercial exploitation which have caused severe decline in biodiversity, including a rising threat against rare medicinal plant species. As elder medicinal plant experts die without proper record-keeping, generations of Indigenous healthcare knowledge risk permanent extinction. Documenting these practices is critical to prevent the loss of Indigenous knowledge and ensure that future benefit-sharing mechanisms respect community ownership.

3. Climate shocks and rodent crises

Tropical forest communities are on the frontlines of climate change. In 2024, extreme monsoon rains triggered severe landslides across Taung Pat Lal, destroying upland hill rice fields, turmeric crops, and valuable customary cardamom agroforest systems. This vulnerability is intensified by cyclical ecological crises. In 1975 and 2016, mass bamboo flowering (Mautam cycles) caused rodent population explosions that destroyed upland rice fields, forcing communities into prolonged economic recovery.

4. Top-down conservation and policy exclusion

Historically, state-driven conservation frameworks and top-down initiatives have ignored customary tenure, treating Indigenous Peoples as threats to forests rather than their primary guardians. Modern market-driven conservation mechanisms such as carbon  and biodiversity credits and offsets risk replicating “fortress conservation” models if implemented without Indigenous Peoples right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), threatening to displace communities from their ancestral lands.

The Need to Align Global Biodiversity Goals with Local Realities

The evidence from Taung Pat Lal (Khlo Do) demonstrates that global biodiversity goals cannot be achieved through top-down mandates or corporate offsetting strategies. As CBD Parties negotiate the operationalization of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) at COP17 in Armenia, the experience of Myanmar’s Indigenous communities’ points to fundamental policy priorities:

1.  Implementing Safeguards and Free, Prior and Informed Consent

All conservation, climate mitigation, and offset projects must enforce Section C of the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) safeguards. Protected area expansion, green infrastructure projects, or carbon and biodiversity credit schemes should only proceed after obtaining the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples over their ancestral lands and resources. Furthermore, conservation and carbon- and biodiversity credit schemes that drive dispossession of Indigenous Peoples should be eliminated.

2. Direct Recognition of Indigenous Territories

Target 3 (30×30) must not be interpreted purely as the expansion of state-managed protected areas or exclusive national parks. CBD Parties must formally recognize and legally protect Indigenous Territories as distinct, self-governed conservation designations. Systems like Taung Pat Lal’s customary fallow management and communal forest protection are effective conservation models that directly maintain tropical forest territories and biodiversity. For example, customary zoning (sacred areas, orchards, watersheds) successfully conserves intact forest canopy without state enforcement.

3. Protection of Environmental Human Rights Defenders

Ensure the full, equitable and meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples in decision-making and uphold complete land tenure rights. Robust, direct legal protection and funding mechanisms for Indigenous environmental human rights defenders operating in conflict zones should be ensured. In conflict-affected tropical forest zones, Indigenous land stewards act as the final defense against illegal logging, extraction, and ecosystem collapse. Implementing Target 22 requires operational mechanisms to protect environmental human rights defenders operating in high-risk conflict environments, and shield local guardians facing violent conflict, airstrikes, and land grabbing.

4. Direct Climate and Biodiversity Financing

Despite safeguarding crucial carbon sinks and biodiversity hotspots, Indigenous Peoples organizations face systemic barriers to direct funding. International financial mechanisms must establish direct, accessible funding streams for grassroots Indigenous Peoples organizations, bypassing centralized state channels to support community-led mapping, traditional knowledge preservation, and climate resilience interventions.

Resilient Stewardship in the Tropical Forests

Myanmar’s tropical forests endure because of the Indigenous Peoples who steward and safeguard them. The customary land governance, agro-biodiversity practices, and Indigenous herbal heritage and practice of Gheba Karen community in Taung Pat Lal (Khlo Do) offer convincing proof that biodiversity conservation and human rights are fundamentally linked. As international leaders gather at COP17 in Armenia to evaluate progress under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF), international policy must be grounded in these local realities. Fully realizing the goals of the KMGBF demands formal recognition of Indigenous territories, legal protection for customary tenure, investment in Indigenous-led monitoring, and robust safeguards for Indigenous frontline environmental defenders.

Due to the sensitive nature of the issues addressed in this article, Indigenous Debates prefers to keep the author or authors anonymous.

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High international gold prices have further increased the economic incentives driving the expansion of these activities. According to the Monitoring of the Andean Amazon Project (MAAP), the Amazon region lost more than 736,000 hectares of primary forest in 2025, with a significant proportion of mining-affected areas located within protected areas and Indigenous territories. Against this backdrop, the Office of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (REDESCA) of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is preparing a regional report examining the relationship between illegal gold mining, human rights violations, territories and governance across countries in the Amazon and the Guiana Shield.

From Alerts to Regional Analysis

The decision to prepare this report builds on several years of monitoring and documentation by the Inter-American Commission and its Office of the Special Rapporteur in response to growing concern over this issue across the region. REDESCA identified it as a priority area in its 2024–2026 Work Plan. In 2019, in its report on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Pan-Amazon Region, the IACHR warned of exposure to high levels of mercury and its impacts on water, biodiversity, and health. In 2021, Resolution 3/21 on the Climate Emergency identified environmental degradation as one of the major threats to human rights in the region.

In April 2024, during an in loco visit to Colombia, the Commission and its Office of the Special Rapporteur identified illegal mining as a driver of water pollution, forced displacement and the financing of criminal organisations. In October of that year, the IACHR and REDESCA raised concerns about the situation of the Yanomami people in the Orinoco Mining Arc, where communities faced displacement, mercury contamination, and the presence of armed groups. In March 2025, REDESCA called for stronger international cooperation, improved gold traceability and tighter controls on the trade in inputs such as mercury. In March 2026, it issued a further alert on the impacts of illegal mining on the human right to water. The issue has also been consistently documented in the Office of the Special Rapporteur’s annual reports on countries across the region.

REDESCA pays particular attention to the differentiated impacts on Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant and tribal communities, women, children and adolescents, and human rights and environmental defenders.

REDESCA pays particular attention to the differentiated impacts on Indigenous Peoples, Afro-descendant and tribal communities, women, children and adolescents.

The objective of the report is to analyse, from a human rights perspective and, in particular, from the perspective of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, the impacts of illegal gold mining, as well as the territorial, cross-border and governance dynamics associated with its expansion. REDESCA pays particular attention to the differentiated impacts on Indigenous Peoples (including those in voluntary isolation and initial contact), Afro-descendant and tribal communities, women, children and adolescents, and human rights and environmental defenders.

Without prejudging the conclusions of the report, which is currently under preparation, the information gathered to date highlights several dimensions of particular relevance to the analysis: mercury contamination and other impacts on health and food; deforestation and ecosystem degradation; loss of territorial control; the expansion of illicit economies and the presence of armed actors; weaknesses in institutional responses; and challenges in ensuring traceability and due diligence throughout the gold supply chain.

A Process Developed through Dialogue and Consultation

The development process of the report has drawn on a range of mechanisms for dialogue, consultation and information gathering. As part of this process, the IACHR convened a regional hearing on its own initiative during its 195th Period of Sessions, held in Guatemala City, with the participation of civil society organisations and representatives of communities and Indigenous Peoples. REDESCA subsequently sent requests for information to States and issued a call for contributions from organisations, affected communities and experts.

From 15 to 19 June 2026, REDESCA conducted a working visit to Brazil, holding meetings with authorities and civil society organisations in Brasília and Boa Vista, Roraima. During the visit, it participated in the 8th General Assembly of the Hutukara Yanomami Association, alongside Indigenous leaders. In July, the Office of the Special Rapporteur held a hybrid consultation with experts in Bogotá and participated in the Regional Meeting on Mining, Territorial Governance and Indigenous Rights in the Amazon, held in Tena, Ecuador. The meeting was organised by PAKKIRU, FOIN Ecuador and the Sacha Supay Quichua Institute of Biotechnology, with the support of IWGIA. There, REDESCA engaged in dialogue with Indigenous leaders from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.

These spaces have made it possible to incorporate not only information on the impacts of illegal mining, but also the experiences, knowledge and responses of Indigenous Peoples themselves. Across the region, Indigenous communities, organisations and authorities have developed territorial monitoring and protection mechanisms, mapping and environmental documentation tools, early warning systems and strategies for engaging with public authorities. Incorporating this knowledge and experience is essential to understanding the territorial dynamics of illegal mining and to developing responses that recognise Indigenous Peoples’ autonomy, ensure their effective participation and reflect the priorities they themselves have identified.

Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights, Territory and the Continuity of Community Life

The impacts of illegal gold mining extend beyond pollution and the loss of forest cover. In Indigenous territories, deforestation, changes to watercourses and ecosystem degradation can affect the territorial relationships that sustain food, health, livelihoods, cultural and spiritual practices and, more broadly, the conditions necessary for the continuity of community life. From an Inter-American human rights perspective, the protection of forests is therefore closely linked to the protection of territories, economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, cultural identity and the self-determination of Indigenous Peoples.

Mercury contamination is one of the primary concerns emerging from the information gathered. Once released into the environment, mercury can be converted into methylmercury and accumulate in fish and other aquatic organisms, thereby entering the food chain of people living in the Amazon. The contamination of rivers can therefore also undermine the right to food by affecting the diets of many Indigenous and riverine communities and putting traditional food practices at risk.

Across territories in Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and other countries, evidence points to links between the expansion of mining, forest loss, the degradation of water sources and increased pressure on protected areas and Indigenous territories.

Across territories in Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and other countries, evidence points to links between the expansion of mining, forest loss and the degradation of water.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned of the serious neurological effects associated with exposure to methylmercury and the particularly high risks faced by children and pregnant women. Studies cited in the information reviewed by REDESCA have found elevated mercury levels in Indigenous communities in Brazil and Peru. Other health impacts add to these concerns: the transformation of territories associated with mining can create conditions conducive to the proliferation of disease vectors, including those responsible for the transmission of malaria.

Deforestation and habitat fragmentation constitute another key dimension of the challenges facing the Amazon. Across river basins and territories in Peru, Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and other countries, evidence points to links between the expansion of mining, forest loss, the degradation of water sources and increased pressure on protected areas and Indigenous territories. These dynamics are further exacerbated when they converge with other illicit economies and actors competing for territorial control.

Illegal Mining, Illicit Economies and Territorial Governance

Illegal gold mining does not operate in isolation. Across the Amazon, it is intertwined with drug trafficking networks, illegal logging, smuggling, the illegal trafficking of mining products, and other illicit economies. This convergence can lead to territorial control by armed groups, threats against Indigenous communities and authorities, restrictions on freedom of movement, and the weakening of State capacities for prevention, monitoring, enforcement and protection.

Gold has characteristics that facilitate its integration into ostensibly legal supply chains: it has a high value-to-weight ratio, can be melted down and mixed with gold from legal sources, and can be traded using irregular documentation or through jurisdictions with inadequate controls. Responses therefore cannot be limited to the places where extraction occurs. They require effective traceability mechanisms, cross-border cooperation and coordination among environmental, customs, financial and judicial authorities, as well as clear responsibilities for businesses involved throughout the gold supply chain.

The risks are particularly severe for Indigenous Peoples in voluntary isolation and initial contact, as any external interference can have irreversible consequences. Women, children and adolescents, Afro-descendant and tribal communities, and human rights and environmental defenders are also affected in distinct ways. In adverse contexts, these groups and individuals may face threats, harassment and violence.

A Report Designed as a Tool

The challenge does not end with documenting the expansion of illegal mining or identifying its impacts. The central question is how to translate human rights standards into responses that can effectively protect territories, prevent further harm and strengthen the capacity of Indigenous Peoples to participate in decisions that affect their ways of life.

The regional report being developed by REDESCA seeks to contribute to this objective by systematising relevant standards and developing recommendations for States, businesses and other relevant actors. At the same time, the process seeks to incorporate the experiences, knowledge and perspectives of Indigenous Peoples and affected communities, not merely as sources of information, but as essential actors in understanding territorial realities and developing appropriate responses.

Faced with an illicit economy that cuts across borders, supply chains and territories, responses must likewise be coordinated, preventive and cross-border in nature. The aim is for the report’s findings and standards to serve as practical tools for dialogue, the promotion of rights and the adoption of measures that place the protection of human rights and forests, as well as the right of Indigenous Peoples to determine the present and future of their territories, at the centre of the response.

The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of REDESCA, the IACHR or the Organization of American States (OAS).

The post Gold, Territories and Rights: Illegal Mining in the Amazon and the Guiana Shield appeared first on Debates Indígenas.

Yet, this longstanding relationship is increasingly under pressure. In several parts of southern and eastern Cameroon, forest territories are affected by logging, agricultural expansion, extractive activities, infrastructure development, and the expansion of conservation areas. The consequences go beyond the disappearance or degradation of trees. As the forest deteriorates, the Baka have to travel longer distances to find certain fruits, medicinal plants and other non-timber forest products. Fish and game are becoming increasingly scarce, while access to certain traditionally used areas is becoming more difficult.

In southern and eastern Cameroon, restrictions on access to forest resources and difficulties related to securing land directly affect the livelihoods of Baka communities. Recent studies show, in particular, that the Baka depend more heavily on non-timber forest products than other communities. Additionally, these studies show that the decline of these resources, particularly when resulting from restrictions on access to the forest, can profoundly alter their patterns of production and consumption. These situations demonstrate that forest protection cannot be separated from securing the land rights of Indigenous Peoples that depend on them.

When Conservation Becomes a Matter of Justice

The challenge is particularly visible in certain protected areas. Biodiversity conservation is essential to preserving the forests of the Congo Basin, but conservation models that exclude populations from their Indigenous territories can have adverse effects on human rights. Research conducted in southern and eastern Cameroon has documented the socio-economic consequences of “fortress” conservation models, under which Baka communities have limited opportunities to negotiate their access to forest areas.

The question, therefore, is not whether to choose between forests and Indigenous communities, but how to protect the forest together with these Indigenous communities. The Baka possess detailed Indigenous knowledge of species, seasonal cycles, water sources, medicinal plants, and hunting and gathering areas. This knowledge constitutes an ecological heritage that can contribute to conservation objectives. At the same time, Indigenous communities must be regarded as rights-holders and not merely as beneficiaries of environmental projects.

This approach requires, in particular, ensuring the effective and meaningful participation of the Baka in decisions concerning their territories and respecting their right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent where measures or projects are likely to affect their lands and resources or ways of life.

Rights-Based Conservation

The experience of the African Indigenous Women Organization Central African Network (AIWO-CAN) shows that such participation can take very concrete forms. One particularly revealing example dates back to 2010, when Baka and Bagyeli Indigenous women leaders, accompanied by AIWO-CAN, participated in the creation of a rainforest garden presented at the Chelsea Flower Show in London. The women presented their traditions, as well as the challenges facing their Indigenous communities, including deforestation, industrial expansion, discrimination and loss of access to forest biodiversity. Maps produced by the Baka to represent their traditional use of the forest were also incorporated into the project.

This example is important because it shows that Indigenous Peoples can document their own relationship with their territories and convey their own messages in international spaces. A map is therefore not merely a technical tool: it becomes a means of making visible a territory and patterns of forest use that may be absent from administrative maps or management plans.

A conservation project cannot be sustainable if affected communities have no means of raising their concerns, challenging a decision or seeking redress when they believe that their rights have been affected.

A conservation project cannot be sustainable if affected communities have no means of raising their concerns.

More recently, the Dja landscape provides a particularly interesting example of this shift towards more inclusive governance. Within the framework of the GEF-8 programme dedicated to the Dja landscape, AIWO-CAN was tasked with contributing to the establishment of a Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) designed to enable Indigenous Peoples, as well as local communities to voice their concerns and have access to a grievance mechanism. The mechanism is designed to complement the right of Indigenous Peoples to Free, Prior and Informed Consent process.

This experience is particularly important for the conservation of the Congo Basin. A conservation project cannot be sustainable if affected communities have no means of raising their concerns, challenging a decision or seeking redress when they believe that their rights have been affected. The establishment of culturally appropriate dialogue and grievance mechanisms can therefore transform conservation: from a model in which Indigenous communities are merely informed, towards a model in which they can participate, question, propose and demand accountability.

Indigenous Women at the Heart of Conservation

The participation of women is also essential. Indigenous women in Cameroon play an important role in transmitting knowledge relating to plants, food, traditional healthcare, and the use of natural resources. They are also directly affected by the economic and social consequences of resource degradation.

AIWO-CAN’s experience demonstrates the importance of strengthening their capacities so that Indigenous women can participate in decision-making processes, defend their land rights and contribute to climate and environmental policies. This approach is particularly relevant in the context of the Congo Basin, where conservation and climate change adaptation must be grounded in the realities of communities.

The 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity therefore provides an opportunity to recall that conservation of the Congo Basin cannot be separated from the rights of the peoples who live there.

The conservation of the Congo Basin cannot be separated from the rights of the peoples who live there.

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework provides an important opportunity to rethink conservation policies through a rights-based approach. Its implementation in Cameroon should not be assessed solely through the number of protected areas or species conserved, but also through the extent to which the rights and participation of Indigenous Peoples are guaranteed.

Achieving global conservation objectives should therefore not result in the further exclusion of Indigenous forest communities. On the contrary, biodiversity policies should recognize their knowledge, guarantee their effective and meaningful participation, protect their territories and ensure their involvement in decisions affecting their lands and resources. The 17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity therefore provides an opportunity to recall that conservation of the Congo Basin cannot be separated from the rights of the peoples who live there.

Towards Conservation with Indigenous Peoples

This situation reveals a fundamental of human rights issue. The loss of, or restrictions on, access to forest territories affect the rights to culture, food, health, livelihoods of Indigenous Peoples of the Congo Basin, as well as participation in decisions concerning land and natural resources. Finally, it may also undermine the transmission of Indigenous knowledge.

The future of the Congo Basin forests will depend not only on forest policies, international investments or the expansion of protected areas. It will also depend on the ability of States and conservation actors to recognize Indigenous Peoples as equal partners and rights-holders. In Cameroon, the experience of the Baka shows that the forest can simultaneously be a space for subsistence, culture, knowledge transmission and biodiversity conservation. The initiatives to which AIWO-CAN has contributed also demonstrate that Indigenous participation can be organized in concrete ways: community mapping, participation in forest policies, grievance mechanisms, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and strengthening the role of Indigenous women.

The question is therefore no longer simply how to protect the forests of the Congo Basin, but also who decides their future and what guarantees are provided for those who have lived there for generations. Sustainable conservation of the Congo Basin must be rights-based conservation: conservation that protects ecosystems without displacing the Indigenous Peoples who have traditionally protected them, that values Indigenous knowledge without exploiting it, and that transforms Indigenous forest communities into genuine partners in biodiversity governance.

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REDD+ (Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries), an approach originally developed within the UN climate negotiations as a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, has gradually evolved into a complex system involving private developers, conservation NGOs, certification bodies, financial intermediaries and state agencies.

This expansion is unfolding within a profoundly unequal global political economy. While international institutions warn of a massive “climate finance gap”, fossil fuel subsidies still amount to trillions of dollars annually, and wealthy countries continue to fall short of their historical responsibility and climate finance commitments. Within this context, carbon markets are promoted as a way to “mobilise private finance” without challenging the economic structures driving the climate crisis in the first place.

For Indigenous Peoples, the implications are enormous. Indigenous Peoples collectively steward vast areas of the world’s remaining biodiversity and carbon-rich ecosystems. Research consistently shows that forests under Indigenous governance tend to experience lower rates of deforestation and better ecological outcomes than state-managed protected areas. However, in many countries, Indigenous land rights, including customary land rights, remain weak, incomplete or entirely unrecognised. This creates the conditions for governments and private actors to claim authority over “forest carbon” while bypassing Indigenous Peoples’ governance and rights over their land and territories.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement risks exacerbating this harm by allowing governments and private actors to generate jurisdictional carbon credits across vast territories without first guaranteeing the land rights of Indigenous Peoples, recognizing their customary institutions and authorities, or ensuring meaningful consent..

From Safeguards to Dispossession

While international safeguards are supposed to protect Indigenous Peoples’ rights in the context of carbon projects, in practice, these protections are frequently weak, non-binding or easily circumvented. In multiple regions, Indigenous Peoples’ organisations report recurring patterns: incomprehensible contracts, rushed consultation processes, unequal access to information, uninformed decisions, and growing restrictions over customary land tenure.

Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is often reduced to a procedural formality or a simple verification requirement. Communities are approached through isolated meetings, technical presentations, or consultations conducted in foreign languages and under significant pressure. Contracts frequently involve highly complex legal and financial arrangements spanning decades, yet communities receive little independent legal or technical support to assess the long-term implications. This information gap leaves room for intermediaries — sometimes described as carbon pirates or cowboys — to secure exploitative contracts.

In many cases, the asymmetry of knowledge and power is profound. Carbon project developers, intermediaries, and certification bodies operate with specialised expertise, legal teams, and access to international finance. Communities, by contrast, are often compelled to make decisions about abstract financial instruments and future territorial-use obligations with limited information about pricing structures, contractual risks, or revenue distribution. The result is an environment in which Indigenous Peoples’ territories become incorporated into volatile global carbon markets without the rights-holders exercising informed and meaningful engagement over the process.

REDD+ pilot projects in sub-Saharan Africa have imposed strict controls on shifting cultivation and forest grazing, while communities report that conservation benefits fail to offset lost livelihoods, leading many to disengage.

REDD+ pilot projects in sub-Saharan Africa have imposed strict controls on shifting cultivation and forest grazing.

Restrictions imposed in the name of carbon conservation impact practices such as shifting cultivation, grazing, hunting, gathering or small-scale forest use. In some contexts, carbon projects replicate old models of “fortress conservation,” in which Indigenous people’s presence is viewed as a threat to environmental protection. For instance, REDD+ pilot projects in sub-Saharan Africa have imposed strict controls on shifting cultivation and forest grazing, while communities report that conservation benefits fail to offset lost livelihoods, leading many to withdraw from these programs. Research into a failed REDD+ initiative in Tanzania found that “wilderness” narratives were used to justify coercive enforcement, forced evictions, and the treatment of Indigenous residents as intruders in their own territories. In the Colombian Amazon, carbon offsetting has similarly been described as a “subtle green grab” that creates “de facto enclosures” on Indigenous lands and disciplines forest communities.

Furthermore, carbon projects reshape local governance systems, exacerbate internal inequalities and generate conflicts regarding representation, benefit-sharing and territorial authority. Benefit-sharing is often unclear, delayed, and minimal, with communities receiving only a small fraction of total revenues. Women, youth and traditional authorities are frequently excluded from negotiations — despite bearing much of the social and environmental burden — while project revenues, when they do materialize, may be captured by local elites or external intermediaries. As the “carbon rights” or the benefit share are often defined together with the land ownership, the carbon market has become another weapon for eliminating customary land rights of Indigenous Peoples due to the non-recognition of customary land rights by many governments. Recurring demands have included access to culturally appropriate and translated information, as well as independent facilitation of FPIC processes.

Phantom Credits and the Logic of Offsetting

Investigations into voluntary carbon markets have found that large numbers of forest-based credits — particularly within REDD+ schemes — are effectively “phantom credits”: credits issued for emissions reductions that either did not occur or cannot be reliably verified. Inflated baselines, weak additionality rules and the displacement of deforestation from one area to another undermine claims that these projects generate meaningful climate mitigation. Yet, these same credits are routinely used by major corporations to support “net zero” claims while they continue fossil fuel extraction and high-emission business models. Therefore, carbon offsetting does not function as a pathway beyond fossil fuels, but rather as a mechanism that allows emissions to continue elsewhere.

This contradiction highlights one of the central problems of carbon markets. There is simply not enough land on Earth to offset current levels of fossil fuel consumption while maintaining existing patterns of extraction and economic growth. The idea that ongoing emissions in the Global North can be balanced indefinitely through conservation projects in the Global South rests on increasingly unsustainable ecological assumptions.

The problem is also epistemic. Carbon markets benefit systems of measurement, verification and monitoring rooted in technocratic and financial logics: satellite imagery, biomass calculations, carbon accounting methodologies and digital registries.

The problem is also epistemic. Carbon markets benefit systems of measurement, verification and monitoring rooted in technocratic and financial logics.

For many Indigenous Peoples, this is not merely a technical failure but a continuation of colonial relations. Territories in the Global South become spaces tasked with absorbing the environmental costs of industrial economies – i.e., greenhouse gas emissions – generated elsewhere. Forests are reduced to carbon stocks registered in distant databases, while Indigenous Peoples are expected to shoulder the burden of climate mitigation for economies that remain dependent on oil, gas and mining.

The problem is also epistemological. Carbon markets benefit and prioritize systems of measurement, verification and monitoring rooted in technocratic and financial logics: satellite imagery, biomass calculations, carbon accounting methodologies and digital registries. These frameworks often marginalise Indigenous conceptions of territory grounded in reciprocity, relationality and responsibilities between human and non-human life.

Between Rejection and Strategic Engagement

Indigenous Peoples’ responses to carbon markets are neither uniform nor static. In various regions, numerous organisations and territorial movements reject carbon markets outright, arguing that they are false solutions that commodify nature while allowing major polluters to avoid meaningful emissions reductions at source.

At the same time, the reality on the ground is often more complex. Carbon markets are already expanding rapidly across Indigenous Peoples’ territories, frequently in contexts marked by simultaneous pressures from mining, agribusiness, logging, infrastructure expansion, and organised crime such as drug trafficking. For some communities, participation in carbon projects emerges not from endorsement, but rather from the need to navigate an increasingly restrictive political and economic environment.

Indigenous Peoples’ organisations are demanding stronger territorial protections, transparent contracts, independent legal support, community-controlled benefit-sharing mechanisms and prior consultation processes designed according to Indigenous Peoples’ governance systems.

Indigenous Peoples’ organisations are demanding stronger territorial protections, transparent contracts, independent legal support, community-controlled benefit-sharing mechanisms and prior consultation processes.

In certain cases, communities view carbon initiatives as a lesser threat compared to other forms of extractive development. Others seek to engage strategically in order to secure territorial recognition, strengthen collective governance or gain leverage within negotiations that are likely to proceed regardless of Indigenous Peoples’ opposition. In this sense, participation may function less as acceptance than as a strategy of defence and political survival.

This has given rise to forms of cautious, rights-based engagement focused on strengthening Indigenous Peoples’ decision-making power rather than legitimising carbon markets themselves. Across various regions, Indigenous Peoples’ organisations are demanding stronger territorial protections, transparent contracts, independent legal support, community-controlled benefit-sharing mechanisms and consultation processes designed according to Indigenous Peoples’ governance systems rather than project timelines.

Beyond Carbon Markets

Despite the diversity of Indigenous Peoples’ positions on carbon markets, one demand remains constant across contexts: self-determination. Whether communities choose rejection, negotiation, or selective engagement, the central issue is the right of Indigenous Peoples to determine what happens within their territories according to their own institutions, knowledge systems and political priorities. Secure collective land tenure must be a precondition for any legitimate form of engagement.

Increasingly, Indigenous Peoples’ organisations are advancing alternative approaches centred on territorial rights, direct access to climate finance and non-market forms of climate action. These proposals emphasise Indigenous governance and protocols, collective land rights, food sovereignty, ecological restoration and the defence of living territories.

The expansion of carbon markets suggests that the global economy is still searching for ways to manage the climate crisis without confronting the structures that produced it in the first place. Indigenous critiques expose the limits of that approach.

The expansion of carbon markets suggests that the global economy is still searching for ways to manage the climate crisis without confronting the structures that produced it in the first place.

These approaches also challenge the broader political economy underpinning carbon markets. Addressing climate change requires far more than new financial instruments. It demands a radical structural transformation of society and the economy, facilitating a rapid fossil fuel phase-out, strict regulation of extractive industries and supply chains linked to deforestation, cancellation of illegitimate debts, and large-scale public investment in Indigenous and community-led initiatives.

The expansion of carbon markets suggests that the global economy continues to seek ways to manage the climate crisis without confronting the structures that created it in the first place. Indigenous critiques expose the limits of that approach. They remind us that forests are not simply carbon reservoirs, and that climate justice cannot be reduced to accounting exercises conducted in distant financial centres.

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On the why, we are often told these days that the main obstacle to addressing the biodiversity crisis is a lack of funding for nature, that this funding gap is too great for governments alone to be able to close, that we consequently need to reorient private capital, and that the best way to do this would be via the creation of a financial market that trades in biodiversity credits. I find this narrative to be debatable and politically biased.

The False Funding Gap Narrative

First, the alleged US$700bn annual funding gap could easily be closed by redirecting a fraction of the existing US$1,700bn annual subsidies to harmful activities. This means that the funding gap could be entirely closed with public funding, without the need to raise taxes or increase deficits, meaning there is no need for private capital at all.

If a political choice is made to rely instead on private capital for conservation, then the most effective and fastest way to reorient private capital would be via environmental regulations that curb destruction. This is because any regulation will have an impact on the future expected profits of the sectors involved, and private capital flows will adjust automatically to the new profit expectations.

Creating a market for biodiversity credits is, therefore, arguably, the last and least effective option if the goal is to address biodiversity loss.

Creating a market for biodiversity credits is, therefore, arguably, the last and least effective option if the goal is to address biodiversity loss.

But even if we were to deem environmental regulations aligned to planetary boundaries too “coercive” and we chose instead to use only the carrot and no stick, it would still be far faster, more efficient and more cost-effective to do this via favourable tax or regulatory treatment rather than by creating a whole new financial market infrastructure based on a pseudo-commodity.

Creating a market for biodiversity credits is, therefore, arguably, the last and least effective option if the goal is to address biodiversity loss. Recent precedents such as the 2008 banking crisis, the Covid recovery plan, or the recent increase in EU defence spending also show that governments can find the money when they want to.

A Lack of Environmental Integrity

In terms of concerns over the creation of a market for nature credits, such a privatization and financialization of conservation policies would fundamentally change these latter by introducing a requirement for profitability. This would, in turn, result in weaker policies than if they were based on regulation. And we have already seen the deleterious consequences of financialization in other areas such as healthcare, education, and housing. Nature credits would also mean a transfer of sovereignty from the State to the financial markets, the priorities of which are unlikely to match ecological priorities, thereby threatening our future and survival.

There is also a fundamental contradiction between the need for a large number of credit types to reflect the large number of species, and the need to transform millions of species into a handful of types of credit in order to have a liquid financial market in which buyers and sellers can easily find trading counterparts. Such a level of simplification is not compatible with environmental integrity.

This makes biodiversity offsetting not “better than nothing”, as is sometimes said, but worse than nothing, as it helps maintain a social licence to destroy, and reduces public pressure for real solutions by giving the illusion that the issue is being addressed.

This is why biodiversity offsetting has had such a poor track record in past decades.

Crucially, I fear that biodiversity credits will also be used largely for offsetting purposes as there is no other business case on this scale. The European Union’s roadmap already places nature credits beyond the mitigation hierarchy —the framework that prioritises avoiding environmental harm first, then minimising, restoring, and only as a last resort offsetting residual impacts. This culminates in offsetting, thereby reinforcing and legitimizing it, particularly as the current balance of political forces is likely to push the EU to align with the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits framework, which explicitly accommodates offsetting.

And yet there is a scientific consensus on the fact that biodiversity offsetting is not possible in most cases, as our scientific knowledge is incomplete, the science of restoration is in its infancy, and it is simply not possible to transform millions of species into a handful of liquid tradable assets. This is why biodiversity offsetting has had such a poor track record in past decades. This makes biodiversity offsetting not “better than nothing”, as is sometimes said, but worse than nothing, as it helps maintain a social licence to destroy, and reduces public pressure for real solutions by giving the illusion that the issue is being addressed.

The First Scandals Are Already Emerging

I fear that biodiversity credits and offsets will primarily take place in the Global South, under the argument that this is where you find the most intact biodiversity. In reality, however, it will also be because land is far cheaper, as a consequence of colonialism. This will lead to the same land-grabbing, tensions, and human rights abuses that have been documented with carbon offsets.

This is in addition to the fact that getting paid to protect nature somewhere in order to enable its destruction elsewhere could well stand in contradiction to the values and worldview of many Indigenous Peoples and communities. Many Indigenous Peoples understand land, waters, animals and plants as kin, or as part of a living territory, not as external “natural capital” or a bundle of “ecosystem services”. Moreover, market‑based schemes risk subordinating Indigenous territorial governance to distant financial actors and State agencies, effectively recentralizing control over territories that Indigenous Peoples have struggled for generations to defend.

The revenues can be very useful for some Indigenous communities. However, as always, the devil is in the detail: what proportion of the governance body is made up of Indigenous representatives, and do they receive at least 50% of the revenue, for example?

The revenues can be very useful for some Indigenous communities. However, as always, the devil is in the detail.

While there is currently a big push to involve Indigenous Peoples and other forest-dependent communities in the various international biodiversity credit initiatives, I understand this to be more for communication purposes than a desire for real co-design and fair sharing of decision-making power and revenues. Getting a few Indigenous leaders on board is a great and cheap way to avoid accusations of green neocolonialism, and to divert attention from the lack of environmental integrity in these schemes. This is because the conversation now becomes one of “look at these poor farmers that we’re helping with our good hearts, how dare you criticize biodiversity credits and take these revenues from them”.

To be clear, I appreciate that the revenues can be very useful for some Indigenous communities. However, as always, the devil lies in the detail: what proportion of the governance body is made up of Indigenous representatives, and do they receive at least 50% of the revenue, for example? Furthermore, biodiversity credit and offset projects are often promoted in situations where communities are under strong economic and political pressure to accept them, and this can effectively undermine the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), turning “consent” into coercion.

The Impact on Indigenous Self-Governance

I would like to emphasize two points: firstly, I understand the current emphasis on Indigenous participation as indicating that a vast proportion of biodiversity credit/offset projects will take place on Indigenous Peoples’ territories rather than in the countries of the Global North. Secondly, I want to caution against the promises of revenues from the sale of these credits. These are hypothetical revenues that will likely be extremely volatile, as they are based on financial market prices, and could easily disappear once political leaders in the Global North no longer see a need to pretend to address the biodiversity crisis. In fact, the UK provides a textbook example of such a risk. After starting a mandatory biodiversity offset market in 2024, leading many to start restoration projects, and farmers and landowners to expect revenues, in 2025 the government introduced an alternative: real estate developers will now have an alternative to offsetting 110% of their residual destruction of nature, by paying a one-off fee into a conservation fund.

If markets collapse, communities may be left without a stable income and unable to return to their traditional livelihoods – pressured instead towards dispossession or further commodification of their lands just to survive.

If markets collapse, communities may be left without a stable income and unable to return to their traditional livelihoods.

The consequences could be especially severe for Indigenous Peoples: long-term contracts may restrict land use and governance while promised revenues are often short-lived and uncertain. If markets collapse, communities may be left without a stable income and unable to return to their traditional livelihoods – pressured instead towards dispossession or further commodification of their lands just to survive.

There is already a growing number of scandals linked to biodiversity credits and these point to deeper structural problems. They include TotalEnergies destroying a national park in Uganda to drill oil and claiming to offset, and Eiffage building a dam in the Ivory Coast and destroying the forest and protected species while falsely promising no net loss. Similar patterns are emerging elsewhere: in Mozambique, TotalEnergies’ megaproject has been associated with misleading environmental claims while, in Guinea, mining projects backed by international financial actors have been linked to large-scale ecological damage framed through compensatory mechanisms.

Who Is Promoting These Markets and Why?

Why then are these markets being promoted, knowing that they will likely be an environmental failure, just like carbon offsetting before them? I understand the primary political goal as one of protecting the status quo for a few more years. These markets give the illusion of action while avoiding any confrontation with the private interests that are currently benefiting from destruction, including mining, agribusiness, infrastructure, and real estate, and avoiding any questioning of outdated and unsustainable economic paradigms.

Put another way, I understand that the European Commission does want to address the biodiversity crisis but only to the extent that it does not get in the way of short-term economic growth and competitiveness, which remain its overarching priorities. I also fear that this market could be instrumentalized to dismantle EU environmental regulations even further, by claiming they are no longer needed as they have been replaced by this market. In a way, this is very similar to climate politics, and carbon offsetting in particular, which are both an environmental failure and a political success, as they have successfully delayed meaningful climate action for many years.

Moreover, these new markets are also not without risk for potential private investors, who will be exposed to massive levels of regulatory and reputational risk surrounding this pseudo-commodity. Recent events in the UK have also highlighted the risks of expecting to earn a stable income from the sale of biodiversity credits.

The primary objective of promoting these markets is to maintain the status quo. Image: Frédéric Hache

The Solutions Are Well-Known

What is needed instead is a shift in existing harmful subsidies and a tightening of environmental regulations in order to address the root causes of biodiversity loss and align with planetary boundaries. We know, for example, that the global food system is the primary driver of biodiversity loss through deforestation to raise livestock. The solution, according to the EAT-The Lancet Commission, is to cut food waste and change diets, incentivizing this by a shift in agricultural subsidies, a tax on unhealthy foods and regulated advertising. This would massively reduce deforestation, cut greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce water pollution from overuse of pesticides.

Another central pillar of an effective biodiversity strategy is the recognition and reinforcement of Indigenous stewardship. Securing collective land titles, recognizing Indigenous legal and governance systems, and providing stable, unconditional public support for Indigenous‑led conservation and territorial defence are among the most effective measures a government can take. The other root causes of biodiversity loss, such as overexploitation of natural resources, climate change and pollution, should likewise be addressed by gradually changing the way we consume, eat and travel, and by putting in place regulations, including to cut plastic production. This would, of course, require confronting private lobby groups such as industrial food and farming, and the current political momentum for this is not great.

I take comfort, however, in the fact that the history of social and environmental progress shows several examples of how transformative change has occurred despite unfavourable political contexts — from the trade union movement to the suffragettes, from the US civil rights movement to the environmental movement, as well as the longstanding struggles of Indigenous Peoples to defend their territories. I also take comfort in the fact that several recent surveys show that a majority of citizens worldwide are already on board, willing to change the way they work and live in order to address the climate crisis. Given enough awareness, they would likely show the same support for addressing the biodiversity crisis. The future has not yet been written; once grassroots organizing reaches a critical mass, we will eventually win.

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One biodiversity credit represents a quantified, measurable and tradable “unit” of a positive biodiversity outcome, such as the restoration or protection of particular ecosystems or species. Leading initiatives insist that, unlike traditional offsets, these credits should serve solely as additional investments in biodiversity rather than as mechanisms to compensate for damage caused elsewhere. In this context, they are presented as a voluntary tool for companies and investors seeking to demonstrate “nature-positive” contributions; however, the distinction between credits and offsets remains unclear in practice.

Various structures driven by States and private actors have explored “dual use,” whereby biodiversity units contribute to both mandatory regulatory offset requirements and voluntary “nature credit” markets. However, this possibility remains controversial due to concerns regarding double counting and system integrity. National approaches vary: For example, England’s Environment Act 2021 established a mandatory, regulated market for biodiversity units, whereas New Zealand currently supports a voluntary, privately managed market that could eventually interact with regulatory offset mechanisms.

The Promotion of Private Financing

Major carbon certification bodies and consultancies are also entering into this space. Organisations such as Verra, South Pole, Plan Vivo, rePLANET, Terrasos and ValueNature have developed methodologies to certify biodiversity outcomes and create tradable units. The appeal is clear: a new product for investors and corporations, and a new revenue stream for intermediaries who already control a large share of the carbon market.

A growing network of initiatives – including the Biodiversity Credit Alliance, the World Economic Forum’s Financing for Nature platform, the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD), and new multilateral funding mechanisms such as the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund under the Global Environment Facility – is shaping the architecture of nature finance and promoting “high-integrity” biodiversity markets. In parallel, initiatives such as the International Advisory Panel on Biodiversity Credits are advancing a Global Biodiversity Credits Roadmap through voluntary, multi-stakeholder processes.

At COP16 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, governments prioritised mobilising private finance for the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) and operationalising the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund, yet they stopped short of formally endorsing biodiversity credit markets. Although the fund recognises Indigenous Peoples’ rights and social safeguards, serious doubts remain regarding how compliance with these commitments will be upheld in practice as biodiversity financing increases.

The Roadmap towards Nature Credits does not adequately address the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including their rights to lands, territories, and resources.

The Roadmap towards Nature Credits does not adequately address the rights of Indigenous Peoples.

In July 2025, the European Commission published its Roadmap towards Nature Credits, a market-based framework aimed at mobilising private sector investment for biodiversity conservation, based on the premise that public funding alone is insufficient. The Roadmap does not adequately address the rights of Indigenous Peoples including their rights to lands, territories, and resources. Nor does it sufficiently address the structural drivers of biodiversity loss, such as biodiversity-harmful subsidies, financial flows and production systems.

Can biodiversity be standardised and sold?

Proponents of this argument note that biodiversity credits can unlock conservation funding, reward sound environmental management, and incentivize better business practices. However, the “financing gap” approach adopted in the KMGBF obscures the fact that current proposals rely heavily on private capital from the very entities most responsible for biodiversity loss. This reinforces patterns in which wealthy states and corporations retain control over “nature finance” flows.

Biodiversity credits thus risk replicating colonial dynamics by concentrating decision-making power and value extraction in the Global North, while positioning Global South territories and peoples as sites of environmental “reparation.” The technical language of “market integrity” ultimately upholds a political project that preserves extractive economic patterns while shifting responsibility for ecological damage onto the lands of Indigenous Peoples and racialised communities.

Current strategies disproportionately benefit market-based tools, avoiding the strengthening of territorial rights, the halting of destructive projects, or subsidy reform.

Current strategies disproportionately benefit market-based tools, avoiding the strengthening of territorial rights, the halting of destructive projects, or subsidy reform.

However, core challenges are often presented as technical problems: defining a biodiversity unit that is scientifically robust, measurable and scalable. In practice, these efforts face deeper ecological and ethical problems. Biodiversity is radically place-based — ecosystems are not interchangeable, and their relationships are complex and often only partially understood. Attempts to define “ecological equivalence” have already failed in biodiversity offset systems. A global review found that most of these structures failed to deliver on their promise of “no net loss” due to poor monitoring, weak enforcement, and unrealistic restoration timelines.

Although biodiversity credits claim to focus on positive outcomes rather than compensating losses, they inherit the same logic of converting complex ecological relationships into standardised, tradable units. The push for global fungibility reflects investors’ need for liquidity rather than ecological realities. As a result, this carries the risk of fragmenting ecosystems into “assets” and “service units” — undermining the holistic approaches to territory that underpin many Indigenous legal orders.

There is also a broader issue regarding reliance on markets to resolve a crisis largely driven by accumulation of wealth. Economic tools, such as credits, should complement — not replace — regulation, public funding and collective forms of governance. Yet, current strategies disproportionately prioritize market-based instruments, while failing to strengthen land rights, halt destructive projects, or reform subsidies.

Indigenous territories at the frontline of biodiversity finance

Many biodiversity credit pilot projects are being developed in the Global South, particularly in forest territories governed by Indigenous Peoples —the same lands that have hosted carbon offset projects over the past two decades, frequently accompanied by rights violations and social conflicts. Protected areas have repeatedly been established without recognising customary tenure, without ensuring Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), and with severe restrictions on traditional livelihoods. Biodiversity credits are likely to intensify these dynamics in various ways:

Land pressure. Assigning a financial value to biodiversity conservation outcomes makes Indigenous territories more attractive to conservation investors, particularly where land rights remain unresolved, creating a risk of long-term management arrangements that marginalize customary institutions.

Control and surveillance. Verification systems such as remote sensing, standardised indicators and digital tokens displace Indigenous knowledge and governance, benefitting external experts whilst potentially monitoring how communities use their own territories.

Unfair contracts. As with carbon projects, communities often lack independent legal advice; contracts may be signed by narrow leadership without collective consent, with small and poorly documented revenue shares vulnerable to elite capture.

Division and criminalisation. Where significant sums of money are at stake, intermediaries can exploit internal differences to secure consent. Those who question projects risk being labelled anti-development or threats to conservation — a serious concern given the growing criminalisation and killing of environmental defenders.

Beneath these concrete risks lies a deeper clash of values. Biodiversity credit methodologies reduce nature to what can be counted, economically valued and traded, whereas many Indigenous knowledge systems are grounded in responsibility, reciprocity and the sacred nature of the natural world — where territory cannot be partitioned into commodities. When that relational worldview is treated as an obstacle rather than a foundation for public policy, biodiversity credits become yet another tool of colonisation.

Whose integrity?

In response to mounting criticism, biodiversity credit initiatives emphasize “high-integrity” principles such as robust governance, FPIC, equitable benefit-sharing, and grievance mechanisms. Some multilateral funds publicly recognise Indigenous Peoples as custodians of biodiversity. However, there is a marked gap between rhetoric and practice. Core principles and methodologies are being designed by coalitions of financial institutions, conservation NGOs and standard-setting bodies, with limited or late-stage Indigenous involvement.

Since the adoption of the KMGBF, numerous Indigenous organisations — including the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues — have repeatedly warned, including at CBD COP16, that biodiversity markets risk replicating the dispossession, inequality, and territorial control observed in carbon offset projects. These organizations emphasise that biodiversity financing must address historical injustices, strengthen direct funding for Indigenous Peoples, and avoid commodifying nature while undermining collective territorial governance. Any emerging biodiversity credit framework must critically incorporate these positions.

Governance must reflect genuine Indigenous leadership. Indigenous organizations must occupy real decision-making spaces in the design and oversight of biodiversity financing mechanisms.

Governance must reflect genuine Indigenous leadership. Indigenous organizations must occupy real decision-making spaces in the design and oversight of biodiversity financing mechanisms.

Three fundamental shifts are required to prevent biodiversity credits from replicating the harms associated with carbon markets. First, rights must precede markets: recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ land, territory and collective tenure rights should be a prerequisite for any credit scheme, rather than an aspiration. This entails the full implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples — particularly regarding FPIC and self-determination — in both law and practice.

Second, governance must reflect genuine Indigenous leadership. Indigenous organisations should hold real decision-making roles — not merely advisory ones — in the design and oversight of biodiversity finance mechanisms, supported by dedicated funding and respect for diverse knowledge systems. Third, the role of credits must remain limited. They should neither license destructive activities through offsetting nor replace regulation and public financing. Binding rules are needed to prevent double-counting, greenwashing and the use of credits to justify mining, fossil fuel extraction or large infrastructure projects elsewhere.

Choosing a different path

The drive for biodiversity credits addresses a real problem: chronic underfunding of biodiversity, particularly where Indigenous Peoples are its primary custodians despite historic marginalisation. Yet, direct funding for Indigenous-led conservation, coupled with legal reforms to secure land and governance rights, would likely deliver far more enduring outcomes than speculative credit schemes.

Whether or not Indigenous Peoples engage with these markets is a matter of self-determination, but any decision must be based on FPIC with transparent information regarding the risks and alternatives. Governments and private actors must not treat credit schemes as a shortcut around the harder decisions of ending destructive industries and confronting unequal power relations.

The fundamental question is which visions of nature, development and justice will shape the future. If biodiversity credits simply reinforce the extractive logic that created the biodiversity crisis, they will represent another round of sacrifices imposed on Indigenous Peoples.

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Throughout the workshop, one message resonated strongly: carbon markets cannot be understood in isolation, but rather as part of a longer history of interventions in Indigenous territories. Participants drew a line connecting different historical periods, from colonization to the rubber boom and the expansion of oil extraction and mining, with contemporary climate initiatives. In each of these processes, Indigenous territories have become the focus of external interests, while the Peoples who inhabit them have had little decision-making power.

The New Face of Extractivism

From this perspective, carbon has become a new element within a familiar pattern. The issue is not simply about conserving forests or reducing emissions, but about who has the power to determine how territories are used and under what conditions. For many participants, these mechanisms serve global interests by helping to sustain prevailing economic models, allowing companies and corporations to continue polluting while claiming to offset their environmental impacts. In doing so, responsibility is increasingly shifted onto Indigenous Peoples, who have long protected and cared for their ancestral territories.

The experiences shared during the workshop reinforced this conclusion. Participants cited examples of conservation projects that have restricted the customary use of Indigenous territories. These restrictions include limiting traditional practices such as hunting, fishing and gathering. In other cases, protected areas or carbon projects were implemented in Indigenous territories without adequate consultation processes, giving rise to conflicts that continue to this day. These experiences also highlighted how conservation agendas can operate as mechanisms of control.

The problem is not only carbon markets. The language changes, but relationships of power remain intact. For this reason, beyond the technical discussion, this issue was highlighted as a political struggle over territory, autonomy, and rights.

The problem is not only carbon markets. Language changes, but relationships of power remain intact.

These processes do not occur in isolation. They are accompanied by narratives that promise economic benefits, local development and so-called “improvements in quality of life”, often reduced to health and education. These are basic rights that states should already be fully guaranteeing. Several participants recalled that similar promises have long been part of the story, particularly in the context of oil extraction, where the outcomes failed to match the expectations that had been created. This collective memory provides an important historical lens through which current carbon-related proposals are understood.

In this sense, the problem is not only the carbon market as an instrument, but also the way it is being introduced into territories marked by histories of dispossession. The language has changed, but the underlying power relations remain. For this reason, the issue was framed not simply as a technical debate, but as a political struggle over territory, autonomy, and rights. Through such disputes, Indigenous Peoples seek to avoid repeating the experiences of the past.

Unequal Decision-Making and Internal Conflicts

Another key theme was how decisions are made within these processes, given the profound power imbalances between the actors involved. While companies, NGOs and governments possess technical expertise, financial resources and institutional backing, local communities often engage in these processes with limited access to information and under starkly unequal conditions. In many cases, external actors arrive with pre-designed proposals and seek to secure rapid agreements that do not align with community timelines or decision-making processes. Negotiations are frequently conducted without going through collective mechanisms such as community assemblies, generating tensions and divisions within communities.

One of the issues most frequently highlighted was the lack of clear and accessible information. Communities do not always have access to complete information about the benefits, obligations and long-term implications of carbon projects. This problem increases the risk of decisions being made under pressure or on the basis of incomplete information, undermining the ability of Indigenous Peoples to fully exercise their right to self-determination.

The importance of free, prior, and informed consent was highlighted with the recognition that there exists a necessity to go beyond its formal application. For this, there was an emphasis on the need to strengthen community-owned decision-making mechanisms.

Decisions are made outside of territories and then they are taken to local communities to receive approval, many times, under fraudulent pretenses.

The role of the State was also called into question. Cases documented in countries such as Colombia and Bolivia showed that state laws and regulations do not necessarily guarantee transparent or equitable processes. In some instances, governments themselves have promoted the aforementioned mechanisms without ensuring the effective participation of Indigenous Peoples. This suggests that decisions are often shaped outside Indigenous territories and only later brought to communities for approval, in many cases under fraudulent pretenses.

In light of this information, participants highlighted the importance of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), while stressing the need to move beyond a merely procedural application of this right. Particular emphasis was placed on strengthening Indigenous decision-making institutions. Such institutions include community assemblies, local statutes, and territorial governments, fortifying each as essential spaces for the assurance of collective decision-making processes and the prevention of imposed or even fragmented decision-making.

Autonomy, Memory and Indigenous-Led Alternatives

The discussions converged on a key point: decisions concerning Indigenous territories cannot be subordinated to external agendas. Autonomy and self-determination are not abstract principles but concrete conditions that enable Indigenous Peoples to decide under what terms they accept and reject decisions. Historical memory is central to this position. Experiences with oil extraction, mining and “conservation and development” policies have left enduring scars such as broken promises, damaged territories and casualties. Consequently, carbon markets are not viewed as isolated opportunities but as part of a broader continuum of external interventions imposed on Indigenous lands and peoples.

Rather than adopting a purely reactive stance, Indigenous leaders emphasized that viable alternatives are already being implemented. These include community forest management, Indigenous production systems, traditional medicine, community-based tourism and Indigenous knowledge systems. Far from being mere aspirations, these are living practices that sustain life in Indigenous territories. Strengthening these alternatives points towards a future that differs fundamentally from the offsetting schemes promoted by external actors.

In this regard, the workshop ended not only with critical reflections but also with a clear direction: strengthening Indigenous-led agendas. The emphasis is on consolidating territorial processes—including organization, economic initiatives, communication and political coordination—that can sustain autonomous decision-making over time. Rather than adapting to carbon markets, the goal is to advance an Indigenous path in which territory is not treated as a tradable asset but recognized as the foundation of collective life.

Communication, Coordination and the Struggle over Narratives

The discussions held during the workshop highlighted the need to contest not only what happens in Indigenous territories, but also the narratives through which these processes are understood and represented. Carbon markets do not advance solely through economic agreements or legal frameworks; they are also promoted through narratives that portray them as the only solution to the climate crisis. In this context, communication becomes a field of strategy, as there is a significant gap between how these projects are presented in international forums and how they are experienced in Indigenous territories. At the global level, they are described as mechanisms for sustainable conservation, yet within communities they are often experienced as processes that generate uncertainty, restrictions, conflict and violations of rights.

This disconnect reinforces the need for Indigenous Peoples to develop and disseminate their own narratives. Participants stressed the importance of strengthening Indigenous communication networks that can facilitate the sharing of information, the visibility of experiences and the production of analyses rooted in territorial realities. The aim is not merely to inform, but to build an autonomous voice capable of responding to narratives imposed from outside. In this way, communication becomes a key tool for territorial defense and political advocacy.

All in all, the debate regarding carbon markets is not only material, but also symbolic and political. It deals with who defines the problem, who proposes the solutions, and under whose terms such decisions are made.

The debate regarding carbon markets is both symbolic and political: who defines the problem, who proposes solutions, and under whose terms such decisions are made.

Coordination among Indigenous Peoples was another key theme. Although national contexts differ, many of the challenges they face are shared across the region. Exchanging experiences, lessons learned, and strategies helps strengthen collective positions and prevents these conversations from unfolding in isolation. Such coordination extends beyond local and national spaces to international arenas, where decision-making directly affects Indigenous territories.

Participants also highlighted the importance of identifying allies and mapping the actors involved in this landscape, recognizing that not all share the same interests. Such mapping enables more informed decision-making and helps Indigenous Peoples identify efforts to draw them into agendas that have not been shaped by their own realities. Taken together, the struggle surrounding carbon markets is not only material but, above all, political and symbolic. At stake are questions of who defines the problem, who proposes the solutions and on whose terms such decisions are made. In this context, communication and coordination are essential tools for sustaining processes of resistance and for building alternatives emerging from Indigenous territories.

A Contested Horizon: The Future of Indigenous Territories

The workshop did not result in a definitive conclusion; rather, it confirmed that a new arena of debate is emerging around Indigenous territories. Carbon markets have become one component within a broader global dynamic in which forms of control over nature, access to nature and decision-making power are being reconfigured. This is no longer solely a matter of direct extraction, but of more complex mechanisms that operate through regulations, certification schemes, financial instruments and climate-related discourses.

In this context, Indigenous Peoples face not only technical or economic challenges, but profoundly political ones. At stake are their territories, rights and autonomy. The discussions made clear that these processes are not being passively accepted. Instead, they reflect a critical reading that identifies in carbon markets a reconfiguration of earlier forms of dispossession, albeit expressed through new languages and justifications. At the same time, the debate went beyond outright rejection, opening space for reflection on what it means to care for and defend territories, how the climate crisis should be addressed, and what kind of future Indigenous Peoples seek to build.

What is at play is not simply a mechanism, but also the sense and feeling over the territory. Here, the message is clear: life, self-determination, and sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples cannot be negotiated.

The climate crisis cannot be resolved simply by placing responsibility in the hands of those  who have historically stewarded and cared for the forests.

Against a global narrative that turns forests into market assets, it is necessary to adopt a different perspective in which territory is not a resource, but a space of life, relations and community. This contrast defines the current moment. For those who took part in the meeting, carbon markets do not represent a solution, but rather a new form of intervention in Indigenous territories that, under the language of conservation and climate action, reconfigure long-standing logics of control and seek to determine the use of spaces that do not belong to them.

In this context, the position is clear: territories are not for sale, nor can they be turned into compensation instruments to sustain economies that continue to pollute. The climate crisis will not be solved by shifting responsibility onto those who have historically cared for forests. What is at stake is not only a mechanism, but the very meaning of territory itself. At this point, the message is clear: life, self-determination and the sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples cannot be negotiated or debated.

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